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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Internet 
A federal district court recently described the Internet as a "never-
ending worldwide conversation."1 The subject matters of this "conver-
sation" are as diverse as one can imagine, with speakers' interests 
ranging from academia to anarchy. This new global forum permits 
people to converse, correspond, shop and conduct many other transac-
tions conveniently over phone lines spanning neighborhoods and 
continents.2 However, the increase in convenience with which these 
transactions can be conducted has also led to a decrease in privacy. 
Transactions and conversations that were once face-to-face and private 
are now taking place at a distance over computers and phone lines 
vulnerable to attack and eavesdropping from any computer-savvy technophile. 
1. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), ajJ'd 138 L. Ed. 2d 
874, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4037, 117 S. Ct 2329. The Internet began in 1969 as computer 
network designed to link the military, military contractors and research universities 
together in the event of a war. From this, the current civilian form of the Internet 
evolved. ACLU v. Reno, 117 S. Ct 2329, 2334. For more background information 
about the Internet, see generally ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET (2d ed. 1994). 
Because of the nature of this topic, a number of the resources discussed in this comment 
were taken from Web pages on the Internet These documents are available from the 
author and available on-line at the Universal Resource Locator (URL), or "address," 
indicated in the corresponding footnote. The brackets ("<" ">") enclosing the addresses 
are not a part of the URL. 
2. The Internet's most commonly used features are news groups, "chat rooms," 
the World Wide Web, and electronic mail ("e-mail"). These features permit users to 
receive and, in some cases, transmit, information of every possible kind. As of 
November 1996, there were an estimated 30 million Web pages on the Internet Gary 
Rodan, Infonnation Technology and Political Control in Singapore, Japan Policy 
Research Institute Working Paper No. 26, Nov. 1996, at 3 (on file with author). As of 
January 1997, an estimated S7 million people spread across 194 countries were 
connected to the Internet, and 71 million people were connected to e-mail servers. 
Rodger Doyle, Access to the Internet, SCI. AM., July 1997. A "server" is a central 
computer through which messages and commands are relayed to users at remote 
terminals. For information about the benefits of using e-mail over alternative forms of 
communication, see infra note 296. E-mail is one of the oldest and most popular uses 
of the Internet 
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Security and privacy are special concerns on the Internet because 
messages, en route to their final destination, frequently pass through 
computer systems operated by private individuals, educational institu-
tions, government agencies, or public interest organizations. Along the 
way, electronic messages can easily be intercepted, read, and even 
altered.3 Moreover, with the increasing interconnectedness of computer 
systems, sensitive information like customer data, financial statements, 
research results, employment records, medical histories, and tax returns 
are vulnerable to attack, alteration or unauthorized disclosure.4 
Many people dismiss these potential threats, believing themselves 
securely anonymous on computer networks. "Who would want to 
monitor my e-mail?" is a response frequently heard when unsuspecting 
computer users are warned of the lack of privacy on-line. Although 
electronic eavesdropping can certainly be targeted at a single person, it 
need not be. Technology exists that permits an eavesdropper to scan the 
contents of massive volumes of e-mail and other electronic data for 
preprogramed words or phrases.5 A knowledgeable technician monitor-
ing an Internet router could set up a search that makes copies of all 
3. Marcelo Halpern, E-Mail Use in the Workplace: Avoiding the Pitfalls, THE 
INTERNET NEWSLETIER: LEGAL AND Bus. AsPECTS, July, 1996, at 11. Despite the 
present deficiencies in privacy and security associated with the Internet, many attorneys 
(18% of those using the Internet) transmit confidential information via e-mail. Only 9% 
of attorneys using the Internet use some form of encryption to protect these confidential 
transmissions. INTERNET NEWSLETIER: LEGAL AND Bus. AsPECTS, July 1996, at 2. 
These deficiencies led one observer to comment, "[t]he Internet, by its very nature, is 
not a good place to conduct business or send sensitive, confidential information ••.. A 
reasonable person wouldn't send sensitive information over the Internet" Technical 
Tips: Getting Started Despite Security Scares, CoMMUNICATIONS WEEK, Sept 9, 1996, 
at 63. 
On protecting the privacy of files and databases from outside hackers, see generally 
D. BRENT CHAPMAN & ELIZABETH D. ZWICKY, BUILDING INTERNET FIREwALLS (1996). 
4. Ilene Rosenthal, Export Controls on Mass Market Software With Encryption 
Capabilities, THE THIRD CONFERENCE ON COMPUI'ERS, FREEDOM AND PRIVACY '93 
PROGRAMS AND PAPERS, 6.25 (1993) (on file with author). The rise and predicted rise 
in telecommuting-working remotely from home-gives further cause for concern about 
the risks associated with transmitting sensitive data over computer, phone and fax lines. 
5. Three years ago, computer programmer and encryption advocate Philip 
Zimmerman warned that it was theoretically possible to set up computers to scan 
computer networks for certain words. He likened this to "driftnet fishing." Sandy 
Shore, Controversy for Computer Privacy Code, Cm. TRJB., Aug. 8, 1994, at Business 
6. More recently, Wall Street investment firms have been able to use new software that 
can automatically monitor electronic correspondence between brokers and clients, 
scanning for evidence of securities violations. Joshua Quittner, Invasion of Privacy, 
'nME, Aug. 25, 1997, 28, 35. See also infra note 295. 
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messages passing through the router containing words of interest to the 
technician.6 Because these "driftnet" search techniques allow searches 
by content, as well as by sender or receiver, the eavesdropper may 
intercept and read the messages of persons he has never even met. 
The answer to these high-tech problems may lie in a very old 
process-using ciphers to make data and communications unintelligible 
to would-be eavesdroppers. Ciphers have been used for centuries, 
ranging in form from something as simple as a decoder ring to complex 
machines developed for use in warfare.7 By encoding data and 
correspondence, senders and recipients can virtually assure themselves 
of privacy. Although many seek this assurance, not everyone agrees that 
ciphers ought to be more widely available. 
Seeking to preserve its ability to wiretap domestic criminal suspects 
and eavesdrop on the secret communications of foreign governments,8 
the federal government has tried to prevent the proliferation of 
encrypting software----powerful ciphers generated by computers that 
allow users to protect their privacy through secret codes.9 These 
6. It does not require much creativity to think of potential search tenns that our 
fictitious technician might use. A "router" is a piece of computer hardware that directs 
the flow of traffic across computer networks. When messages are sent over the Internet, 
routers scan network connections and send the message through the portions of the 
network with the least congestion. As a result of the frequent detours that routers throw 
up, messages rarely travel a linear route from the sender to the recipient Routers pennit 
Internet traffic to move more quickly, but the sender of a message has no control over 
the path through which the message is sent 
7. "One if by land and two if by sea" is an example of a cipher dating back to 
the Revolutionary War. A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, 
the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 709, 713 (1995). For 
infonnation concerning more recent uses of encryption by the military, see i11fra note 13. 
8. The government, as the defendant in one of the most significant cases in this 
area of law, stated that: 
[a] critical national security interest is to maintain an effective capability to 
gather foreign intelligence information. History is filled with examples of the 
need for the United States to break foreign codes in order to detennine where 
enemy ships, submarines, aod troops have been deployed, and other critical 
intelligence information. Through export restrictions, the United States seeks 
to control the foreign availability of cryptographic devices and software that 
might end up in the wrong hands, be deployed against the United States, 
hinder the government's foreign intelligence collection efforts, or othenvise 
undermine crucial national security interests. 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
or in the Alternative.for Summary Judgement, Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 
F. Supp. I (1996) (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://people.qualcomm.com/karn/export/ 
memorandum.html> [hereinafter Kam, Points & Authorities]. 
9. These ciphers work by churning the message through a mathematical formula 
that creates garbled text as the output This garbled message is transmitted and then 
descrambled by its recipient 
Here is an example of the scrambled output created by POP, a popular encryption 
program. The original message was simple, "sample POP output" The encrypted 
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attempts to control encryption have taken the form of government-
created encryption systems engineered to guarantee government access, 
and of controls on the e'Wort of privately created encrypting equipment 
and computer programs.1 
This Comment discusses the need for privacy over the Internet and 
looks at the constitutional validity of previous and current regulations 
governing the export of privacy-enabling technologies. In particular, it 
seeks to analyze the constitutionality of the current regulatory scheme in 
light of the competing interests of privacy and freedom of expression on 
the one hand, and the need to protect national security on the other. 
B. Encryption 
The process of changing plain text into unintelligible code is called 
"encryption."" Changing an encrypted message back into plain text is 
message reads: 
--BEGIN PGP MESSAGE--

















As is apparent, tbis is a very sophisticated way of protecting the privacy of a message. 
The output, called "ciphertext," cannot easily be reduced to an intelligible message. 
I 0. Recently, the Clinton Administration has proposed domestic regulations that 
would establish a key escrow system for those wanting to participate in public key 
programs. Administration Proposes Domestic Encryption Controls, 3 CDT POLICY POST, 
Mar. 26, 1997 (copy on file with author and available on-line at (visited Feb. 8, 1998) 
<http:ffwww.cdt.org/publications/pp_3.02html>). 
I 1. Encryption and digital signatures are closely related. For more information on 
digital signatures and proposed legislation that would create the necessary infrastructure 
to make the use of digital signatures economically feasible, see C. Bradford Biddle, 
Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability Allocation in a Public 
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called "decryption." In order to decrypt an encrypted message, one must 
have the code or "key" that corresponds to that message.12 For years, 
encryption was the exclusive domain of the military intelligence 
community13 and advanced mathematics classes.14 However, recent 
advances in computer-generated encryption have brought this technology 
Key Structure, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1143 (1996). 
12. Encrypting and decrypting codes are commonly referred to as "keys." For a 
discussion of the different types of keys currently in use, see generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, 
APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 2-4 (1994). Modern encrypting systems use either one or two 
keys. The one key or "symmetric" systems work much like a traditional decoder ring. 
The sender and receiver must negotiate beforehand to share the secret key. Although 
effective, this system presents the problem of bow to share the encrypting/decrypting key 
without compromising its security. Two key (asymmetric) crypto systems solve this 
problem. With the two key system, each user has a unique pair of keys: a "public key" 
and a "private key." To encrypt a document, the sender first looks up the receiver's 
public key, much as one would look up a phone number in a telephone directory. The 
message is then encrypted using the public key and is sent. Once the sender bas 
encrypted the message with the public key, only the bolder of the recipient's private key 
can decrypt the message. Describing the two key system, one author likened the 
technology to a voice mail system: 
With [a voice mail] system, you are assigned both a phone number (including 
a mailbox number) and a password. The phone number/mailbox number 
combination is public and may be given out to anyone you wish. People may 
then call in and leave you messages in your mailbox. However, since only 
you know your password, only you can gain access to your messages. 
WAYNB M. GoNYEA, SELLING ON THE INTERNET 27 (1995). 
In addition to ensuring privacy, the two key system can also be used to verify the 
source of messages sent over the Internet. By encrypting a message twice, once with 
the recipient's public key, and again with the sender's private key, the recipient can 
verify the identity of the sender. This double encryption process allows the recipient to 
rest assured that no one else can read the message he has been sent and, by successfully 
decrypting the message with the sender's public key, he can be certain of that the 
message is authentic. 
As a general rule, the longer the key, the harder it will be for an eavesdropper to 
unscramble the message. This basic concept is central to the discussion in this Comment 
and the debate surrounding the regulation of encryption. The government regulations are 
triggered by the length of the key. Because of the mathematics involved, key lengths 
of an asymmetric/public key system and a symmetric/private key systein cannot be 
compared on an apples-to-apples basis. For example, a 40-bit symmetric key offers 
approximately the same degree of protection as a 512-bit asymmetric key. For ease of 
discussion, key lengths mentioned in this paper refer to symmetric systems, unless 
otherwise noted. 
13. For information on military applications of encryption technology during 
WWII, see generally THE CODE BRBAKBRS (F. H. Hinsley & Alan Stripp eds., 1993); 
Doris A. Paul, THB NAVAJO CODE TALKERS (1973). 
14. Computer generated codes are driven by mathematical algorithms. Thus 
encryption is occasionally a subject dealt with in advanced college level mathematics 
courses. In fact, cryptography has been described as "fundamentally based on problems 
that are difficult to solve." Paul Fahn, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About 
Today's Cryptography, (published by RSA Laboratories) at 12 (visited Oct. 5 1996) 
<http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/newfaq/home.html> [hereinafter Fahn, FAQ]. An 
"algorithm" is a mathematical term, defined as a "step-by-step problem-solving 
procedure." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992). 
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to the private sector, making it possible for ordinary citizens to 
communicate in codes so secure that not even the United States military 
can decipher the encoded messages.15 These strong enc~ting 
algorithms, which derive their strength from the length of the key, 6 are 
sometimes called "military-grade" encryption. 
Today's military-grade encryption uses long combinations of numbers 
and letters to ensure the privacy of the encrypted message. Even slight 
increases in key length yield exponentially more secure ciphertext. A 
64-bit key (symmetric) is 256 times more difficult to crack than a 56-bit 
key. Cracking a 128-bit key17 would require the use of all 200 million 
computers estimated to exist in the world and would take one million 
times the age of the universe to exhaust all possible key combina-
tions.18 In contrast, it was estimated in 1996 that any individual could 
crack a 40 bit key such as "apple" in 12.7 days with the use of a single 
15. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text 
16. Encryption security depends on the length of the key, measured in ''bits." Two 
key (asymmetric) systems require significantly longer keys to ensure the same level of 
privacy as a shorter one key (symmetric) system. All keys referred to in this Comment 
128 bits or shorter are symmetric keys; anything over 128 bits is an asymmetric key. 
17. A symmetric key 128 bits long has 1.0 x la37 possible key combinations 
generated from a password of just 16 characters. A 40-bit key, corresponding to a 
password only five characters long, such as "apple," produces a mere 932 billion (9.32 
x 1011) key combinations. David Friedman, A World of Strong Privacy: Promises and 
Perils of Encryption, 13 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y J. 212, 214 n.5 (1996); see infra note 19. 
18. SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 136. Note that these estimates denote the amount 
of time required to check all possible key combinations. Cracking a code by checking 
all the possible combinations is called a "brute force attack" and may not be the most 
efficient way of breaking a code. It is possible that an eavesdropper will get lucky on 
her first try and stumble across the key. However, the chances of this happening are 
virtually nonexistent Statistically speaking, the key will usually be found mid-way 
through the process. This means that, on average, it will take only 500,000 times the age 
of the universe to crack a 128-bit key. Id. 
Cryptographers have recently discovered a new way to crack even the strongest codes 
used in encrypted "smart cards." This method relies not on computing power, but rather 
on a phenomenon that occurs when smart cards are irradiated with microwaves. John 
Markoff, 2 Israelis Outline New Risk To Electronic Data Security, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct 19, 
1996, at A38. 
Finally, researchers at IBM recently announced that they may have developed a new 
encryption scheme that is completely unbreakable. Although practical applications of 
the newly discovered mathematical problem are some time off, such a development 
would be significant for privacy advocates, criminals and law enforcement officials. Ed 
Golden, IBM Encryption Scheme Holds Significant Promise, INFOWORLD, May 21, 1997, 
at 21. 
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personal computer.19 By using 100 computers collaborating to break 
the code, the time needed is reduced to three hours.20 Journalists have 
reported that the American government can crack a 56-bit symmetric key 
in fewer than 12 seconds.21 Currently, a 40-bit symmetric key is the 
longest key exportable from the United States for general use abroad 
without obtaining any permission from the government.22 The Com-
merce Department will grant a license to export encryption with key 
lengths up to 56 bits if the exporter agrees to imElement a key recovery 
system that will be operable within two years. Key length alone is 
the measure by which administrative agencies initially decide whether to 
scrutinize the export of certain encryption technology. 
Although today's most secure keys appear dauntingly long, rapid 
developments in computer processor speed may make these encrypting 
algorithms vulnerable to attack.24 Such has been the fate of the most 
19. Friedman, supra note 17, at 214. Although a 40-bit key is considered 
relatively weak, using the keys found on a standard computer keyboard yields roughly 
9.32 x 1011 (932 billion) possible key combinations even with this "weak" key. Making 
the same assumptions about the keyboard characters available for use, a 56-bit key bas 
5.52 x 1017 possible key combinations (where 56 bits corresponds to a ?-character kera; 
71 = 5040; and the keyboard has 95 characters. Thus, 1/5040 x (1/95)7 = 2.83 x 10· 8, 
The odds of guessing the right key are consequently, 1 in 5,52 x 1017 possible key 
combinations). 
20. SCHNEJER, supra note 12, at 260. 
21. Kristi Essick & Jeff Algh, Encryption Policy Fails to Please U.S. Vendors, 18 
INFO WORLD, Oct 7, 1996, at 14. 
22. Encryption Items Transferred from the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce 
Control List, 61 Fed. Reg. 68572 (1996) (action interim rule Dec. 30, 1996) codified at 
15 C.F.R. §§ 700-99 (1997) [hereinafter Interim Rule]. Until recently, exporting any 
encryption using a key longer than 40 bits required registration with the State 
Department as an arms dealer. Paul Fahn, RSA Frequently Asked Questions About 
Cryptography Export Laws at 4, 10 (published by RSA Data Security) (visited Feb. 8, 
1998) <http://www.rsa.com/PUBS/expJaq.pdf.> [hereinafter Fahn, Export FAQ]. 
23. Interim Rule, supra note 22. The Department of Commerce will review these 
licenses every six months to ensure that progress benchmarks are met Id. at 68574. A 
"key recovery system" is a mechanism that permits law enforcement officials seeking 
to eavesdrop on a suspect to retrieve an encryption key from a key-escrow agent. 
24. Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel Corporation, observed that computer 
processor manufacturers could double the speed of their processors every 18-24 months. 
For nearly 40 years, Moore's observation, dubbed "Moore's Law," has proven accurate. 
Nevertheless, Moore and other industry experts doubt whether this rate of change can 
continue much longer, Gordon E. Moore, Can Moore's Law Continue Indefinitely?, 
COMPUTERWORLD, July I, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, PAPERS File; see 
also G. Dan Hutcheson & Jerry D. Hutcheson, Technology and Economics in the 
Semiconductor Industry, SCI. AM., Jan. 1996, at 54. 
The Economist recently reported that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) is investigating the possibility of creating a quantum computer, a machine 
theoretically capable of simultaneously contemplating 125 alternative solutions to a 
problem. Today's computers can contemplate only one solution at a time. The new 
machine might be capable of cracking codes that are uncrackable with present 
technology. The Weirdest Computer of All, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1996, at 97-98. 
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widely used encryption system in the world today, the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES). In 1977, engineers at IBM working with the United 
States government developed DES. Operating on a 56-bit symmetric 
key, DES has since become the most widely used encryption system in 
the world today, and yet only recently has one been allowed to export 
it without first registering as an arms dealer.25 
Although DES appears to remain relatively safe,26 experts agree that 
a newer encryption standard with a longer key should be used in the 
future.27 The National Institute on Science and Technology (NIST) has 
recertified DES as the official encryption standard of the United States 
government every five years since its creation in 1977.28 DES was last 
recertified in 1993.29 NIST has indicated that it may not re-certify DES 
in 1998, however.30 
As computer networks become more interconnected and people 
increasingly use electronic media to store and transmit sensitive 
information, demand for encrypting software has increased greatly.31 
At the same time, computers have become faster, making encryption that 
was once secure vulnerable to attacks by those armed with the latest 
machinery. As a result, both real and imagined vulnerabilities in today's 
encryption have increased the demand for stronger encrypting hardware 
and software.32 
In response to this demand, and in an effort to frustrate governmental 
efforts to stem encryption proliferation, a computer programmer named 
Phil Zimmerman privately distributed a military-grade encryption 
25. Under the old encryption regulations, one had to first register as an anns dealer 
before pennission to export could be granted. Under the new standards, one must now 
commit to producing a key recovery system within two years, surrender the decryption 
keys on export, or export only weak encryption. See infra Part Il.B. 
26. In 1994, an attack could be successfully performed on a DES key in 3.5 hours 
but required an estimated one million dollars worth of equipment Fahn, FAQ, supra 
note 14, at 70. 
27. Scientists at RSA currently recommend key lengths of at least 80 bits 
symmetric and 768 bits asymmetric. Fahn, Export FAQ, supra note 22, at 4. 
28. Froomkin, supra note 7, at 736 n.106. 
29. Revision of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46-1 Data 
Encryption Standard (DES), 58 Fed. Reg. 69347, 69347-48 (1993). 
30. Fahn, FAQ, supra note 14, at 70. 
31. Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 6.25. 
32. Id. 
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program that quickly made its way onto the Internet.33 Since 
Zimmerman made available copies of his program "Pretty Good Privacy'' 
(PGP) in 1991,34 copies of the program have spread to all four comers 
of the globe, much to the chagrin of law enforcement agencies world-
wide.35 After news of the international proliferation of PGP spread, the 
United States Customs Service launched an investigation of Zimmerman 
that lasted three years. The Customs Service closed the investigation in 
January 1996 without an indictment.36 PGP, operating with asymmetric 
key lengths from 512 to 4096 bits, is virtually unbreakable.37 
33. A copy of PGP, Zimmerman's program, can be downloaded for free from the 
MIT server. (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://web.mitedu/network/pgp>. 
34. The United States Customs service investigated Zimmerman for three years in 
connection with the posting of PGP and its subsequent distribution abroad. The 
investigation was closed in January, 1996 without an indictment Phil Zimmerman, 
Verbatim, COMPUTERWORLD, July 22, 1996, at 37. 
35. Criminals have already started to use PGP to thwart criminal investigations. 
Pedophiles and nee-Nazis have used their computers to encrypt data that law 
enforcement officers suspect contain names of associates and contacts. Efforts to decrypt 
these files have proven futile. Eric Dexheimer, Police Uneasy With This Cure for the 
Common Cold, SAN DIEGO UNION TRm. COMPULINK, Mar. 1, 1996, at I. Within days 
of the supposedly restricted release of version 2.6 of PGP in the United States, a 
researcher in Hamburg Germany received a copy of the program. He subsequently made 
the program available on the University of Hamburg computer server. See Froomkin, 
supra note 7, at 750 n.167-68 and accompanying text 
"The International PGP Home Page," located on a server in Norway, offers 
information on PGP and links to servers offering PGP outside of the United States, It 
is located on the Web at (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://www.pgpi.com>. The purpose 
of the Home Page is "to promote the use of PGP worldwide, and to be a resource pool 
for information on PGP" (last modified Jan. 9, 1998) <http://www.pgpi.com/about>. This 
page provides links to computers offering the newest version of PGP (5.0 Windows 95) 
in Russia, Romania, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Brazil, Japan, Italy, Germany, Austria, 
Norway, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Greece, South Africa, Hungary, Switzerland, and Australia 
(visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://www.pgpi.com/download/> (from this page, select which 
version of PGP you wish to download and then click 'More Sites' to see the list of 
nations offering the program). 
A British Web site lists servers throughout Europe which offer PGP for download 
(visited Oct 5, 1996) <http://thegate.gamers.org/-tony/pgp.html>. The site cautions in 
jest, ''Remember: Do not obtain PGP from a site in the USA or Canada, unless you are 
physically within the borders of the USA or Canada. Disobeying the above instruction 
is probably very very naughty." Although warning in jest, the author makes a good 
point Downloading PGP from a computer located inside the United States or Canada 
to a computer outside of those nations violates EAR/ITAR export laws. However, 
downloading the same program from a computer outside of the United States or Canada 
is perfectly legal. 
36. Zimmerman, supra note 34, at 37. 
37. For a more complete treatment of PGP's specifications, refer to the PGP 5.0 
Manual. (Note, because the manual contains information about PGP, it too is subject 
to encryption distribution limitations. A copy can be obtained with the PGP do\•mload 
after verifying that the user is connected through a computer server located in the United 
States. Alternatively, a copy is available from the author). 
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Members of the law enforcement community execrate this high level 
of security, much lauded by users of the Internet. Law enforcement 
officials at the local, state and national levels have lobbied for restric-
tions on the use and export of encryption in an effort to preserve their 
ability to eavesdrop on electronic communications.38 
The release of PGP in 1991 has since fueled the debate over the right 
to privacy versus law enforcement's need to eavesdrop on criminal 
suspects.39 In response to these concerns, and in an effort to stem the 
use of encryption by terrorists, members of organized crime, and drug 
dealers, the Clinton Administration in 1993 prorosed a "key escrow 
system" popularly known as the "Clipper Chip.'"' 
Initial public response to the Clipper Chip proposal was overwhelm-
ingly negative.41 Civil libertarians and industry representatives 
vociferously lobbied Congress to defeat the proposed legislation.42 In 
38. FBI Director Louis Freeh testified in the last Congress against a Senate bill 
that would liberalize encryption controls. He argued that private encryption systems "can 
prevent police officers on a daily basis from conducting basic searches and seizures of 
computers and files •... Without the ability to promptly decrypt encrypted criminal or 
terrorist communications and computer files, we in law enforcement will not be able to 
effectively investigate or prosecute society's most dangerous felons." Ramon G. 
MacLeod, Computer Privacy Could be Casualty of War on Te"orism-Govemment Wants 
Keys to Codes, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 21, 1996, at A5. 
39. See, e.g., John Mintz & John Schwartz, Chipping Away at Privacy? 
Encryption Device Widens Debate Over Rights of U.S. to Eavesdrop, WASH. POST, May 
30, 1993, at Hl. 
40. Essentially, the Clipper Chip system would work as follows: computer and 
communications equipment manufacturers would produce hardware that would encrypt 
and decrypt using "Skipjack," a classified encrypting algorithm developed by the 
National Security Agency (NSA) with a key length of 80 bits. The government would 
then hold a copy of the key used to decrypt communications scrambled with Skipjack. 
To appease consumers and civil libertarians, President Clinton proposed that the 
government-held key be split in two and stored with two "trusted escrow agencies." 
Froomkin, supra note 7, at 759. Both halves of the key would he needed to decrypt a 
scrambled message. Suggestions for escrow agencies have included the Treasury 
Department and the National Institute of Weights and Measures. To obtain the keys to 
decode a conversation or data transmission, a law enforcement agency would simply 
have to present a request to the escrow agency for the keys. For more information about 
the Clinton key escrow proposal, see generally Froomkin, supra note 7, at 742-64. 
41. "[N]early all of the comments received from [the US computer] industry [in 
response to the proposed standard] opposed the adoption of the standard." Approval of 
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 185, Escrowed Encryption 
Standard (BES), 59 Fed. Reg. 5997, 5998 (1994) [hereinafter FIPS 185]; see also Kevin 
Power, Industry Says No to Clipper, 14 GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS, Aug. 21, 1995, at 73. 
42. Among the groups who lobbied against Clipper were: the ACLU, Microsoft, 
IBM, Apple Computer, Novell, and Sun Microsystems. 
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the wake of the negative publicity surrounding the Clipper Chip 
proposal, President Clinton dropped his plan for the development of a 
single national encryption standard developed by the government.43 
However, President Clinton continued to prohibit the export of hardware 
and software using strong encrypting algorithms. More recently, 
President Clinton has used the export control issue as a bargaining chip 
with a new encryption policy proposal, dubbed Clipper ill.44 The 
proposal "allows for the use of any method of encryption as long as the 
user stores an electronic key with a bank or other trusted third party 
[from whom the government can gain access to the key in connection 
with a criminal investigation].'"'5 
The Clinton Administration has thus launched a two-pronged attack on 
the spread of strong encryption.46 First, President Clinton has tried to 
regulate domestic use through proposed key escrow systems and the 
FIPS 185.47 Second, President Clinton has tried to check the spread of 
privacy-enabling technology by applying export regulations to the export 
of cryptography, in order to reduce international availability. The second 
prong has slowed the proliferation of strong encryption both abroad and 
domestically. A recent report by a government commission created to 
study encryption policy issues noted the following: 
Export controls also have had the effect of reducing the domestic availability 
of products with strong encryption capabilities. The need for U.S. vendors 
(especially software vendors) to market their products to an international 
audience leads many of them to weaken the encryption capabilities of products 
43. In 1994, the government officially accepted the Escrow Encryption Standard 
(EES) for federal agencies as a voluntary standard. FIPS 185, supra note 41. Acting 
on this standard, the Department of Justice purchased 9,000 AT&T Clipper telephones 
using this technology. Froomkin, supra note 7, at 769. Although the EES is voluntary, 
it is the only standard approved by the government for government use. As a result, the 
EES is becoming a defacto national standard for federal agencies and those who wish 
to communicate securely with these agencies. 
44. Bruce W. McConnell & Edward J. Appel, Enabling Privacy, Commerce, 
Security & Public Safety in the Global Information Infrastructure, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF 
TI-IE PRESIDENT, OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET (May 20, 1996) <http://www.cdt. 
org/crypto/clipper_IWclipper_m_ draft.html>. For more information about the original 
Clipper Chip proposals as well as the amended proposals, see generally (visited Feb. 8, 
1998) <http://www.cdtorg/crypto/>. 
45. Michael Kantor, Encryption Policy Balances Economic, Safety Concerns, 
SEATTI.E TIMEs, Sept 18, 1996, at BS; see also Ramon C. McLeod, Computer Privacy 
Could be Casualty of War on Terrorism-Government Wants Keys to Codes, S.F. 
CHRON., Aug. 21, 1996, at AS. 
46. "The government's response to [proliferation of encryption] has been twofold: 
an attempt to make the nation's phone and communication networks more open to 
government taps, and a drive to limit the spread of data encryption. . . . The government 
hopes Clipper will replace [private] chips providing unbreakable encryption for 
conversations." Mintz, supra note 39. 
41. See supra note 41. 
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available to the domestic market. Thus, domestic users face a more limited 
range of options for strong encryption than they would in the absence of export 
controls.•& 
As communication and commerce become increasingly globalized, and 
as the American domination of high technology fields like cryptography 
wanes, the need for a single universal encryption standard increases.49 
Export regulations have had the effect of inhibiting the emergence of this 
universal encryption standard. The following Part looks at two 
generations of encryption regulations and cases challenging the 
regulations. 
II. RESTRAINTS ON EXPORTATION 
On November 15, 1996, President Clinton signed Executive Order 
13,026, entitled Administration of Export Controls on Encryption 
Products.50 This order, drafted in response to public demands for more 
liberal encryption export controls, changed the basic repi1atory 
framework that had governed encryption exports since 1977 .5 Prior 
to this change, encryption technologies had been treated as "munitions" 
for pun,oses of export licensing. The State Department regulated these 
exports through a complex procedure that required the applicant to 
disclose details about the nature of the encryption, its intended and 
48. CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING nm INFORMATION SOCIETY (Kenneth 
W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds. 1996). (Report by government commission comprised of 
the Committee to Study National Cryptography Policy, the Computer Science & 
Telecommunications Board, the Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and 
Applications, and the National Research Council) available on-line at 
<http://www.nap.edu/reading/reader.cgi?auth=ftee&label=uk.book.0309054753> 
( emphasis added) [hereinafter Committee Recommendations]; see also Friedman, supra 
note 17, at 224. 
49. "Such single products were subject to export control and thus the NSA 
acquired substantial influence not only over what was exported, but what was sold in the 
U.S." SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at xiii. 
50. Executive Order 13,026 Administration of Export Controls on Encryption 
Products (32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2399, Nov. 15, 1996) [hereinafter Clinton 
Order]. 
51. Id. Executive Order 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1977) was the initial 
Presidential delegation of control over munitions exports under the authority granted to 
the Executive Branch by Congress in the Arms Export Control Act of 1977 (AECA}, 22 
U.S.C. § 2778. The predecessor to the AECA was the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 
formerly 22 U.S.C. § 1934. The President also delegated the power granted under the 
'54 Security Act to regulate encryption exports to the Secretary of State, Executive Order 
10,973 § 105, 26 Fed. Reg. 10469 (1961). 
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potential applications, and its intended foreign recipient. President 
Clinton's Executive Order shifted regulatory responsibility for most 
commercial encryption to the Commerce Department. This move was 
ostensibly intended to liberalize the export controls and to encourage 
freer use of encryption. Although the new regulations are in fact more 
liberal than the previous ones, the underlying features of the two regimes 
are the same. 
The salient features are these: both regulatory schemes require 
governmental approval prior to export; approval is tied to the security of 
the encryption, as indicated by the key length; and neither system 
purports to allow judicial review of decisions denying applicants 
permission to export their information. 
The following Part discusses why the features shared by the new and 
old regulatory schemes are at the heart of the legal debate surrounding 
their constitutionality. In the end, it does not matter which arm of the 
Executive Branch regulates encryption. So long as a scheme exists 
which conditions permission to export of source code52 on prior 
approval based on the strength of the encryption, and fails to permit 
judicial review of licensing decisions, the First Amendment is implicat-
ed. Thus, although President Clinton's shift of control from one 
regulatory body to another represents an historic change in regulatory 
policy, it represents little change in terms of the constitutional merits of 
the regulatory scheme. Because the Department of Commerce controls 
are so new, courts are just now considering the constitutional validity of 
the new regulations. In light of the underlying similarities between the 
old and new regulations, however, older cases and analysis considering 
the merits of the State Department regulations are on point. 
The relatively recent district court decisions discussing the constitu-
tionality of the old regulations under the Department of State are useful 
in determining whether the new Department of Commerce regulations 
and their successors are constitutionally permissible. The new Com-
merce Department regulations are governed by the Export Administration 
52. Source code is a precursor to software. By processing source code with a 
translation program called a compiler, the source code can easily be converted into 
object code, the actual binary language of computers. Software is a package that 
contains compiled object code. The debate surrounding encryption extends to both 
source code and software. For all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction 
between the two in the context of this debate. The following is an example of source 
code for part of a popular encryption program: 
#!/bin/perlspo777i<X +d* lMLaA* I N%0JdsXx IM I N/dsMO< 
j] dsj $/=unpack(' H * ', $_); $_='echo 16 di o \ U$k" SK$/ 
SM$n\EsNOp[lN*l lK[ d2%Sa2/d0$i'Ixp'ldc';sl\w//g;$_=pack('H* ',/(( .. )*)$/) 
(visited April 2, 1997) <http://online.offshore.eom.ai/arms-trafficker/>, 
1414 
[VOL.34: 1401, 1997) Cyberspace 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Regulations (EAR).53 The Department of State regulations were 
governed by the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR).54 
When referring to encryption export regulations generally, I will use the 
combined acronym EAR/ITAR. 
A. ITA.R 
With the passage of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress 
delegated to the President the authority to control the import and export 
of certain defense items.55 The AECA grants the President the 
authority to create a list of items that are subject to import and export 
restrictions. This list is known as the "United States Munitions List'' 
(USML).56 The Secretary of State, acting under the authority of an 
executive order,57 promulgated the USML as a part of the International 
Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR).58 As one might expect, the USML 
controls the export of weapons such as tanks, missiles, and other 
instruments of war. In addition, the USML controlled the export of 
encrypting devices, source code,59 and software.60 
53. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 (1997). 
54. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1997). 
55. 22 U.S.C. § 2751-2799 (1994). These statutes include the provision that 
In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United 
States, the President is authorized to control the import and export of defense 
articles and defense services. The President is authorized to designate those 
items which shall be considered as defense articles and defense services for the 
purposes of this section and to promulgate regulations for the import and 
export of such articles and services. The items so designated shall constitute 
the United States Munitions List 
22 u.s.c. § 2778 
56. Id. 
57. Exec. Order No.11,958, as amended in 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (Jan. 18, 1977). 
58. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1997). 
59. Source code is ''merely a means of instructing a computer to perform a 
function." Kam v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 27 n.19 (D.D.C. 1996). 
See supra note 52. 
60. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (Category XIII) (1995). While dual use encrypting 
technologies were still under the control of the ITAR, the State Department classified 
as a munition a $300 device to be installed on top of a television set for browsing the 
World Wide Web and sending e-mail messages. The device, using a 128-bit cipher, is 
currently sold in stores such as Sears and Circuit City but could not be exported without 
an anns dealer license. John Markoff, U.S. Classifies a Device to Surf the Web a 
Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1996, at D2. It is not clear whether this device is 
exportable under the newly modified EAR. 
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Under the ITAR regime, the Department of State determined whether 
an item is within the scope of the USML when the would-be exporter 
filed a Commodity Jurisdiction Request (CJR). If the Department of 
State found the item to be within the scope of the USML, that item 
could not be exported without a license.61 The Office of Defense Trade 
Controls, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, decided whether to grant 
or refuse a license for the export of an item that the State Department 
determined to be within the ambit of the USML.62 A determination by 
the State Department that an item is on the USML meant that exporters 
and manufacturers of that item must register with the government as 
arms dealers or manufacturers.63 
B. Current Regulatory Framework: EAR 
Pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 197964 (BAA), Presi-
dent Carter issued an Executive Order delegating control over most of 
the BAA to the Secretary of Commerce.65 After the delegation, the 
Department of Commerce promulgated the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR).66 Although the EAR did not originally have 
jurisdiction over the export of encrypting applications, it gained 
jurisdiction in 1996 with the issuance of the Executive Order 13,026.67 
By this order, the President transferred the regulation of all dual-use and 
nonmilitary encryption commodities, software, technology (both 
encryption hardware and software) and source code to the Commerce 
Department under the EAR effective December 30, 1996.68 After this 
transfer, military encryption is still subject to regulation under the ITAR, 
while nonmilitary applications are now governed by the EAR.69 
Although the EAR is certainly more liberal than the ITAR in terms of 
permitting the export of a variety of commodities without preapproval, 
certain EAR commodities still require a license before they can be 
61. 22 u.s.c. § 2778(b)(2) (1994). 
62. 22 C.F.R. § 120.l(a) (1997). Requirements for export licenses are set out in 
Part 123 of the ITAR. 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.1-123.26 (1997). 
63. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.4, 122.1 (1997). 
64. The EAA is codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 2401-20 (West 1991 Supp. 1997), 
65. Exec. Order No. 12,214, 45 Fed. Reg. 29783 (1980). 
66. "EAR" refers generally to 15 C.F.R. chapter VII, sub-chapter C. 15 C.F.R. 
§ 730.1 (1997). 
61. See Clinton Order, supra note SO. 
68. Id. 
69. The rules governing this handover of control state that enczyption that has been 
"specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted or modified for milital)' 
applications (including command, control and intelligence applications)" will remain 
under !TAR jurisdiction. 61 Fed. Reg. 68633 (December 30, 1996). The rules governing 
non-milital)' encryption can be found at 15 C.F.R. § 742.15. 
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legally exported.70 These commodities are listed on the Commerce 
Control List (CCL), and include, among other things, certain encrypting 
applications and source code.71 Depending on the strength of the 
encryption, the Commerce Department can grant a license for export, 
waive the requirement that the exporter file for a license, grant the 
license if the exporter agrees to create a key recovery system over the 
next two years, grant the license if the exporter hands over the keys to 
the encryption at the time of export, or deny the application.72 
Applications for export licenses are submitted to the Department of 
Commerce's Bureau of Export Administration (BXA).73 Determina-
tions whether to grant a license are made on a case-by-case basis.74 
As of this writing, the Department of Commerce has promulgated an 
interim rule to govern what can and cannot be exported under the 
EAR.75 These rules purport to liberalize controls restricting the export 
of strong encryption while taking the first steps toward creating a 
70. 15 C.F.R. § 730.7 (1997). ''Export'' is defined under the EAR as "an actual 
shipment, transfer, or transmission out of the United States .•• ; or [a] transfer of such 
software in the United States to an embassy or affiliate of a foreign country." 15 C.F.R. 
§ 734.2(b)(9)(i)(A)-(B) (1997). In addition to shipping or transmitting encryption outside 
of the United States, the Commerce Department interprets the EAR's definition of 
"export'' as it relates to encryption on the CCL to include the, "downloading or causing 
the downloading of, such software to locations (including electronic bulletin boards, 
Internet file transfer protocol, and World Wide Web sites) outside the U.S., or making 
such software available for transfer outside the United States, over wire, cable, radio, 
electromagnetic, photo-optical, photoelectric, or other comparable communications 
facilities accessible to persons outside the United States, including transfers from 
electronic bulletin boards, Internet file transfer protocol, and World Wide Web sites, 
unless the person making software available takes precautions adequate to prevent 
unauthorized transfer of such code outside the United States .••• " 15 C.F.R. 
§ 734.2(b)(9)(ii) (1997). 
71. The CCL control policies are found at 15 C.F.R. §§ 742.1-. 15. The actual 
CCL is codified at 15 C.F.R. § 774. Encryption export controls are codified at 15 
C.F.R. § 742.15 and listed on the CCL in Supplement No. 2 to Part 774. 
72. The rules dictating the exportability of certain encryption are rather byzantine. 
They can be reviewed by the bold at 15 C.F.R. §§ 742.15, 774. 
73. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730.7, 774.1 (1997). 
74. Letter from James A. Lewis, Director of the Department's Office of Strategic 
Trade and Foreign Policy Controls, to petitioner Peter Junger, dated January 29, 1997 
(visited Sept. 1, 1997) <http://sarnsara.law.cwru.edu/comp_law/crypto_export/>. Peti-
tioner Peter Junger's case against the government is discussed infra note 112. 
75. The Department of Commerce has not provided an estimate for when a final 
rule will be issued. Semiannual Agenda of Regulations, 62 Fed Reg. 21520, 21541 
(1997) (providing the date 00/00/00 on the timetable listing when the final rule 
corresponding to the Interim Rule will be promulgated). 
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''worldwide key management infrastructure."76 While this key manage-
ment infrastructure is being conceived, planned and created, the current 
regulations permit the export and re-export of up to 56-bit encryption, 
provided that the exporter promises implement a key recovery scheme 
over the next two years. The key recovery system envisioned in the 
Commerce Department's rules would permit law enforcement officials 
to crack the codes generated with the software that was exported under 
the rules. By requiring that exporters promise to implement such a 
system, the progress of which is measured every six months through the 
use of benchmark measures, the Department of Commerce has set up a 
goverment-initiated market-led conversion to a new key escrow system. 
Whether this system will enjoy any uniformity or general acceptance 
remains to be seen. 
C. Common Threads in EAR, /TAR, and Future Regulatory Schemes 
As previously explained, the EAR and ITAR regimes are nearly 
identical at their core. The central features of both are discussed below. 
Because of the salience of the regulated technology to law enforcement 
officials, corporations, and privacy advocates, changes to the form and 
the details of the EAR regime are certain to be ongoing. Nevertheless, 
so long as these core features remain a part of any regulatory effort that 
controls the export of encryption, constitutional concerns are raised. 
1. Pre-Export Review 
Both EAR and ITAR require that the would-be exporter obtain 
permission before sending the encryption out of the country. This is a 
logical requirement where the government has an interest in keeping 
secret information inside the country. However, any review prior to 
publication or distribution raises unique constitutional concerns discussed 
in the next Part.77 
2. Strength-Based Determinations 
Rather than impose a fl.at ban on all encryption exports or all exports 
to certain nations, both EAR and ITAR regulate encryption on the basis 
of the level of protection that it offers. Under the ITAR scheme, the 
Department of State granted permission to export encryption operating 
76. Interim Rule, supra note 22, at 68573. It is doubtful whether such an 
international scheme would ever be viable. See supra note IS. 
77. See infra Part m.B. 
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at a key length up to 40 bits. Encryption operating above the 40-bit 
threshold that could be used to encode a message78 was rarely, if ever, 
allowed out of the country through legal channels. The Commerce 
Department has liberalized export rules by permitting the export of 
encryption with key lengths of up to 56 bits if the exporter promises to 
implement a key recovery system over the next two years that will 
ensure continuing law enforcement access to data and information 
encrypted with these algorithms.79 Encrypting applications using keys 
longer than 56 bits cannot be exported without the immediate surrender 
of the keys. 
Although the ITAR and the EAR differ in their treatment of encryp-
tion with keys lengths between 40 and 56 bits, both use the relative 
strength of the encryption to make distinctions between those programs 
that may be exported and those that may not. This inquiry into strength 
has constitutional implications as well. 
3. Judicial Review Not Permitted 
The presence of a right to judicial review is a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition for a censorship scheme to pass constitutional 
muster.80 To the extent that encryption licensing schemes can be 
likened to censorship schemes, the right to judicial review will be an 
important consideration in determining whether such a scheme is 
constitutional. The ITAR regulatory scheme does not permit judicial 
review under the generally applicable Administrative Procedures Act 
(APA).81 Likewise, Clinton's executive order transferring control of 
dual-use encryption to the Department of Commerce specifically states 
that no right of judicial review is created with this transfer.82 
78. Some encryption can only be used for non-communicative purposes. A 
common example of this is the encryption that is used to encode personal identification 
numbers (PINs) used at ATMs. 
79. Interim Rule, supra note 22, at 67573. 
80. See infra Part ill.C. 
81. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h). See infra Part ill.A., for a discussion of the AP A. 
82. "[This order] is not intended to, and does not, create any rights to administra-
tive or judicial review, or any other right or benefit or trust responsibility, substantive 
or procedural •.. ". Clinton Order, supra note 50, at § 3. 
1419 
4. Regulations Applicable to Software and/or Source Code 
Both the !TAR and EAR impose regulations on encrypting hardware, 
software, and source code. Regulations governing the export of 
encrypting hardware almost certainly do not raise First Amendment 
issues. However, regulations governing software and computer operating 
instructions known as source code almost certainly do raise First 
Amendment issues.83 The EAR defines encryption source code as "[a] 
precise set of operating instructions to a computer that, when complied, 
allows for the execution of an encryption function .... "84 
ITAR also regulates software and computer source code. 'I\vo recent 
lawsuits filed against the State Department appealed administrative 
decisions denying permission to export encrypting source code in print 
and on diskette.85 In both suits, the Department of State denied 
petitioners permission to export encrypting source code.86 After 
unsuccessfully appealing the CJR decisions within the State Department, 
plaintiffs Karn and Bernstein filed suits alleging violations of their 
constitutionally protected rights. As the standard bearers for the case 
against regulation of encryption, the Kam and Bernstein cases illustrate 
the problems, difficulties and incongruities found in the ITAR regulatory 
scheme. Due to the underlying similarities between !TAR and EAR, the 
issues raised in these cases carry through to EAR as well as to all 
similar future regulatory schemes. 
D. Karn v. Department of State87 
In 1994, Philip J. Kam submitted CJR's to the State Department for 
a determination of whether two items were subject to the export 
restrictions of the !TAR. 88 These items were: Applied Cryptography, 89 
a book on computer encryption widely available throughout the United 
States; and a computer diskette containing the cryptographic source 
codes printed in Section V of Applied Cryptography, together with 
programmer's comments interspersed within the code itself. In response 
to Karo's CJR, the State Department granted permission for the export 
83. See infra Part III.B.1. 
84. Interim Rule, supra note 22, at 68,585. 
85. Kam v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); Bernstein 
v. Department of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
86. Source code is ''merely a means of commanding a computer to perform a 
function". Kam, 925 F. Supp. at 27, n.19. 
87. Id. at I. 
88. Id. at 3. 
89. See SCHNEIER, supra note 12. 
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of the book, but not the diskette.90 Karn appealed the decision through 
the State Department's internal review process and lost.91 Karn subse-
quently filed suit in federal district court for the District of Columbia. 
In his suit, Karn alleged that the State Department had violated his 
First and Fifth Amendment rights when it denied him permission to 
export the diskette.92 Karn further alleged that the decision to prohibit 
the export of the diskette was arbi~ and capricious and an abuse of 
discretion in violation of federal law.9 
In response to Karn's allegations, the Department of State filed a 
motion for summary judgment asserting that, under Subsection (h) of the 
AECA, the court could not hear Karn's claims, and that the licensing 
scheme had not violated Karn's constitutional rights.94 The District 
Court agreed that Karn's APA-based claims were nonjusticiable,95 and 
held that the licensing scheme did not violate the Constitution.96 While 
Karn's appeal was pending, President Clinton moved control over 
encryption exports to the Department of Commerce. In light of this 
move, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case back down to the District 
Court for a rehearing once the new Export Administration regulations 
had become effective.97 After this ruling, Karn needed to resubmit his 
export petition under the new regulations, this time to the Department of 
Commerce. 
90. The CJR and Deparpptment of State response is available on-line at (last 
modified Feb. 5, 1998) <http://www.people.qualcomm.com/kam/export/executive.html>. 
91. Kam, 925 F. Supp at 4. For the text of Kara's initial appeal, see (visited Feb. 
8, 1998) <http://www.people.qualcomm.com/kam/export/harris_appeal.html>. 
92. Kam, 925 F. Supp. at 2. 
93. Kam alleged that the decision was in violation of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA). Id. The APA and its relationship to cryptographic export controls is 
discussed further infra, Part m. 
94. Kam, 925 F. Supp. at 26. 
95. Id. at 8. 
96. Id. at 26. 
97. Kam v. United States Dep't of State, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(unreported opinion). 
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E. Bernstein v. Department of State98 
Daniel Bernstein was a Ph.D. candidate in mathematics at the 
University of California at Berkeley when he developed the "snuffle 
encryption system." Bernstein wrote source code for the snuffle system 
and an academic paper describing the system. He sought to publish his 
academic papers and the text of the source code internationally.99 In 
addition, Bernstein sought permission to discuss the paper's contents 
with foreign nationals who might attend international conferences for 
mathematicians.100 Bernstein filed a CJR seeking approval for these 
activities from the Department of State. 
The Department of State refused Bernstein's request for permission to 
publish and export the text of the source code, 101 prompting him to file 
suit. Bernstein's complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, 
alleging that the AECA/ITAR licensing scheme amounted to an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, and was unconstitutionally 
vague and over-broad.102 Bernstein, like Karn, also alleged that the 
decision to deny his petition was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse 
of power under the APA. 103 The State Department countered with the 
same argument used against Kam that the APA-based claims were 
nonjusticiable under the AECA and that denial of Bernstein's CJR 
amounted to a constitutionally permissible restraint on conduct rather 
than an unconstitutional restraint on speech.104 
In the first of three opinions, a California district court judge ruled that 
Bernstein's computer source code was "speech" for purposes of the First 
Amendment protection and analysis. 105 In the second of the Bernstein 
opinions, the court held that the imposition of the ITAR export licensing 
98. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 
(Bernstein I); Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 
1996) (Bernstein II); Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, C-95-582, Aug. 25, 1997, 
1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13146 (Bernstein Ill). 
99. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp at 1430. 
100. Id. 
101. Initially, the source code was not on computer diskette, as was the case in 
Kam. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1429. Originally, the Department of State denied 
permission to export either the source code or the academic papers. However, once 
Bernstein had filed suit, the Department of State granted permission to export the 
academic papers, but not the source code. Id. at 1433. After control over encryption 
moved to the EAR, Bernstein sought permission to export snuffle's source code on 
diskette as well. EAR liberalized source code export rules when the code is to be 
distributed in print See supra note 154. 
102. Id. at 1430-31. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 1431. 
105. Id. at 1436. 
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requirements on source code "speech" amounted to a violation of the 
First Amendment.106 In the third opinion, the court considered wheth-
er the newly promulgated EAR encryption rewlations were constitution-
al as applied to Bernstein's source code.1 Once again, the court 
struck down the provisions. An appeal has been filed, however, staying 
the majority of the injunction pending a final ruling by the Ninth Cir-
cuit.108 A new issue is raised on appeal-whether Bernstein may 
export a computer disk containing the snuffle source code. 
In denying the State Department's initial motion for summary 
judgment, the Bernstein court held that source code is speech and that 
the constitutionally-based claims advanced were justiciable.109 The 
Kam court decided to treat the contents of the Karn diskette as speech 
because it included English-language comments, but specifically declined 
to rule on whether source code alone would be speech. It then ruled that 
the licensing scheme was constitutionally permissible as a content-neutral 
restraint on speech.U0 In contrast to the rulings on Bernstein 's nearly 
identical claims, the court in Kam found that the constitutional claims 
were, as a matter oflaw, unsupported.111 
What follows is a discussion of the constitutional issues raised in Kam 
and Bemstein.112 These issues are: (1) whether the judiciary has the 
106. Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289-90 (discussing the requirements for a 
constitutional licensing scheme, the court concluded that "[t]he IT AR scheme •.. fails 
on every count''). 
107. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, No. C-95-0582, 1997 WL 530865 
at *l (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 1997). 
108. Bill Kisliuk, Patel Again Pokes Hole in Encryption Export Ban, RECORDER, 
Aug. 26, 1997, at 1; Wendy R. Leibowitz, Encryption Regulations Struck By District 
Court, NAT'L L.J., Sept 8, 1997, at Al2. 
109. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1439 (N.D. Cal. 
1996). 
110. Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 25-26, 34-35 (D.D.C. 
1996). See also note 148. 
111. Id. at 8-14. 
112. In a third case challenging the ITAR/EAR schemes on constitutional grounds, 
a law professor at Case Western Reserve University School of Law has brought suit to 
challenge a determination that posting his course materials on the Internet would violate 
ITAR/EAR. Professor Peter Junger sought to make encryption materials available to his 
students over the Internet for a class titled "Computers and the Law." The Internet 
materials, made available through a Web site, included an encrypting application. After 
he asked the State Department whether his materials fell within the IT AR, the 
Department decided that the posting of encrypting applications on the Internet was 
tantamount to "publication," and therefore within the scope of the ITAR. 
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authority to hear challenges to encryption licensing decisions, (2) 
whether the encryption restraints impinge on conduct or speech, (3) 
whether the encryption licensing restraints are content-based or content-
neutral, and ( 4) if the encryption licensing scheme is a restraint on 
speech, whether national security concerns remove the source code from 
the realm of "protected speech." 
ill. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
A. Justiciability of Encryption Regulations and National Security 
In both Karn and Bernstein, the plaintiffs asserted that the judiciary 
had federal question jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act 
of 1946 (APA)113 and under the United States Constitution.114 In its 
reply, the State Department argued that the decision to include or 
exclude certain items from the USJ.\1L was a nonjusticiable issue under 
the 1989 amendment to the AECA that purports to bar judicial review 
of USJ.\1L classification decisions.Us The threshold issue that challeng-
es to the regulatory scheme raise then is whether the judiciary has the 
power to review the actions of the State Department in the instant case. 
This power to review, if present, comes from either the APA, the 
Constitution, or both. 
Except where the Constitution requires it or where legislation permits 
it, there are no constitutionally guaranteed rights to judicial review of 
legislation, administrative rules, or regulatory decisions.116 In 1946, 
Congress created a presumptive right to judicial review of administrative 
decisions with the APA.117 Section 701 of the APA creates the right 
of judicial review of all governmental agencies and their decisions, 
Since this initial CJR detennination, Mr. Junger has appealed, filed suit, and, most 
recently, amended his complaint to include the Department of Commerce under the 
EAR. The complaint and its legal arguments closely mirror the Kam and Bernstein 
complaints. Mr. Junger alleges that the regulations amount to an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on free speech, and that encryption source code and software is more akin to 
protected speech than functional conduct (last modified Sept. 3, 1997) <http://samsara, 
law.cwru.edu/comp_law/crypto_export/>. 
113. Codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1989 & Supp. 1995). 
114. Kam v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 3; Bernstein v. United 
States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1431 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
115. Karn, Points & Authorities, supra note 8, at 11-16. 
116. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). 
117. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1989 & Supp. 1995). 
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except in cases where Congress has expressly precluded judicial review 
in the text of a statute.U8 
In 1989, Congress amended the AECA by adding Subsection (h).119 
This subsection explicitly bars judicial review of classification decisions 
under the !TAR and the AECA.120 In the case of APA-based claims 
against the AECA, the 1989 addition of Subsection (h) removes the Act 
from the scope of the APA. 
In 1990, The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Subsection 
(h) when it refused to hear a challenge to a CJR determination in United 
States v. Martinez. 121 The Martinez court held that challenges to 
encryption export license decisions were beyond the province of the 
court, commenting that "[t]he question whether a particular item should 
have been placed on the Munitions List possesses nearly every trait that 
the Supreme Court has enumerated [that] traditionally renders a question 
'political' ."122 However, the court in Martinez noted that the parties 
had not raised any constitutional challenges to the CJR.123 The court 
held that encryption export licensing decisions are the domain of the 
Executive Branch, but left open the possibility of constitutionally based 
challenges, notwithstanding the limitations on judicial review imposed 
under Subsection (h).124 Presumably, this ruling would apply as well 
to any successor to the AECA that purported to bar judicial review. 
118. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599 (1988) ("[s]ection 701(a), however, limits 
application of the entire AP A to situations in which judicial review is not precluded by 
statute.") (emphasis added). 
119. Pub. L. 101-222 § 6. 
120. Subsection (h), entitled "Judicial Review of Designation of Items as Defense 
Articles or Services," states: 
The designation by the President (or by an official to whom the President's 
functions under subsection (a) have been duly delegated), in regulations issued 
under this section, of items as defense articles or defense services for purposes 
of this section shall not be subject to judicial review. 
22 u.s.c. § 2778(h) (1994). 
121. United States v. Martinez, 904 F.2d 601, 602 (11th Cir. 1990). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 603. 
124. Id.; see also INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 ("No policy underlying the 
political question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both actiog in 
concert and in compliance with Art I, can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that 
is a decision for the courts."); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, n.5 (1979); 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841, n.12 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. I (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Marbury v. Madison, 
I Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 180 (1803) ("A law repugnant to the constitution is void."). 
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Thus Kara's and Bernstein's APA-based claims appealing ITAR 
decisions appear to be blocked by Subsection (h). However, their 
constitutionally-based claims may be heard if the court finds the CJR 
determinations to be outside of the political question doctrine. 
The new encryption regulations governed by the EAR do not seem to 
preclude judicial review of administrative licensing decisions. However, 
President Clinton's executive order transferring control from the State 
Department to the Commerce Department specifically states that no 
rights of judicial review or administrative review are created with the 
transfer.125 The Court's opinion in Webster v. Doe seems to state that 
only Congress can preclude APA-based review.126 Since the underly-
ing legislation empowering the Executive Branch to control these 
commodities does not create APA preemption, 127 it appears that the 
invocation of the preemption is an act of executive fiat. Thus, the 
language of the Clinton order should not be read as a limit on judicial 
review, but rather as a disavowal of any intention to expand on any 
rights to review. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a right of review does not necessarily 
oblige a court to hear the case. A court may decline to hear a challenge 
to an administrative action if the issue falls within the political question 
doctrine, and the court finds itself ill-equipped to render a judgement on 
the merits. The most frequently cited definition of the scope of the 
political question doctrine was stated by the Supreme Court in Baker v. 
Can:128 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Baker, announced 
two key factors that courts should consider in deciding whether they 
have the proper authority to review the actions of another branch of the 
federal government.129 These factors are: (1) whether there is a "textu-
ally demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department," and (2) whether there is a "lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the issue.130 
125. See supra note 82 and accompanying text 
126. See supra note 118. 
127. Although AP A preemption exists under the AECA/IT AR scheme, no such right 
of preemption exists under the EAA/EAR scheme. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(h) (West 1991), 
128. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), on remand206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 
1962). 
129. Id. at 217. Note that these factors are disjunctive. Satisifaction of one or the 
other could be enough to trigger the political question doctrine and render an issue 
nonjusticiable. 
130. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
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1. Commitment to Coordinate Political Branch 
It is well established that issues of national security and foreign 
relations like those raised in Kam, Bernstein, and Junger131 are 
traditionally given over to the Executive Branch.132 Nevertheless, 
although the Executive Branch has dominion over these issues133 and 
its decisions in these areas are generally beyond judicial review, 
"judgment concerning the 'political' nature of even a controversy 
affecting the Nation's foreign affairs is not a simple mechanical 
matter."134 One can see this flexibility in the fact that the judiciary 
has, on a number of occasions in the past, heard challenges to Executive 
decisions that dealt with national security or foreign affairs concems.135 
Thus, precedent suggests that Brennan's statement that a constitutional 
grant of power to a coordinate political branch of government invokes 
the political question doctrine has not been applied strictly in the years 
since it was first written. In fact, Brennan rejected the argument that 
131. See supra note 112. 
132. This principle was underscored by the Supreme Court in 1936: 
As Marshall said in bis great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of 
Representatives, ''The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external 
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong., 
col. 613. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at a very early day in 
our history (February 15, 1816), reported to the Senate, among other things, 
as follows: "The President is the constitutional representative of the United 
States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign 
nations ••• ". 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
In some cases, Congress has added to the Executive branch's authority and autonomy 
with the passage of legislation that purports to grant wide discretion in matters related 
to national security. In the Webster case, Congress expressly granted great discretion 
to the Executive branch in dealing with the hiring and firing of CIA employees, allowing 
the director to terminate an agent's employment, ''whenever he [the Director] shall deem 
such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States." Webster 
v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 594 (1988) (citing National Security Act of 1947 § 102(c) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403(c))). 
133. U.S. CONST., art II, § 2. 
134. Bal(er v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 283 (1962). 
135. See e.g.,Webster v. Doe, 602 F. Supp. 581, 582 (1986); rev'd, 796 F.2d 1508 
(D.D.C. 1986); ajf'd in part and rev'd in part, remanded, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), on 
remand, 859 F.2d 241 (D.D.C. 1988); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713 (1971 ); United States v. Progressive, Inc. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
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anything simply touching national security was beyond the judiciary's 
power of review.136 
2. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards 
Likewise, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
by which to judge the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive 
has been, in practice, a less than dispositive factor in deciding whether 
to invoke the political question doctrine. In Webster v. Doe, the Court 
remanded to a district court for a determination whether the CIA 
director's decision to fire an employee for his ~otential risk to security 
violated the employees' constitutional rights. 37 In the Progressive 
case, a federal district court reviewed sensitive information about the 
construction of a hydrogen bomb and found gublication of the informa-
tion to pose a threat to national security. 38 Finally, in New York 
Times, Co. v. United States, a divided Court reviewed sensitive Pentagon 
documents regarding the United States involvement in Vietnam and 
Cambodia during the Vietnam War. The Court decided per curiam that 
because the government had not sufficiently demonstrated the necessi~ 
of the prayed-for injunction, the Court would not permit its issuance.1 9 
In all of these cases, the plaintiffs asked the courts make difficult 
determinations about a potential threat to national security despite the 
fact that the courts lacked the expertise to make these determinations. 
Nevertheless, the courts reviewed these cases on their merits, rather than 
invoke the political question doctrine and defer to the judgment of the 
better-informed branch: the Executive. It is clear then that courts have 
not blindly applied Brennan's test announced in Baker. However, this 
conclusion begs the question of when courts will apply the test and when 
they will not. 
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue, 
it appears that the nature of the plaintiff's claim dictates the standard of 
review to be applied when determining justiciability. Thus, the familiar 
standards of review such as rational relation140 and strict scrutiny,141 
which require an examination of the relationship between the 
136. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
131. Webster, 486 U.S. at 605. 
138. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990. 
139. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714. 
140. Kadnnas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988) ("a statute is 
upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate government objective."). 
141. The rights of a free press and free speech are "fundamental" for purposes of 
constitutional law analysis. State actions violating fundamental rights require strict 
scrutiny. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 782, 774 n.3 (1986). 
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government's action and the plaintiff's complaint, are implicitly applied 
to justiciability determinations while expressly applied to the issue of 
constitutionality. In terms of practical effect, these two applications 
merge into a single application, with a finding of unconstitutionality 
necessarily predicated on a finding of justiciability. This consistency 
between justiciability standard of review and constitutionality standard 
of review is necessary when one considers the alternative: an application 
of a single standard of review applied to all cases. Such single standards 
would either take the form of a presumption of justiciability (akin to a 
strict scrutiny standard), or a presumption ofnonjusticiability (akin to a 
rational relation standard). 
If the courts presumed nonjusticiability for cases touching national 
security, 142 it appears the courts would never have heard the cases 
discussed above: New York limes, Progressive, and Webster. In all of 
these cases, the governmental action appears to bear a rational relation 
to the interest of protecting national security. 143 Applying a rational 
relation standard to determine justiciability would virtually bar the courts 
from hearing any cases which touched on national security issues. On 
the other hand, universal application of a presumption of justiciability 
would serve to expand the number of cases reviewable by the courts and 
would likely permit review of many cases that are properly entitled to 
the benefit of the political question doctrine. 
It therefore appears that the criteria to be used when deciding 
justiciability extend beyond the mere presence or absence of ''.judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards" and any constitutional 
commitments to "coordinate political branches." Courts making 
justiciability determinations also consider (with or without a conscious 
aclmowledgment) the nature of the claim brought by the aggrieved party. 
In the cases of Kam and Bernstein, if the regulations are content-based, 
and if source code is speech, then the court should apply a strict scrutiny 
142. This standard might be applied in an effort to defer to the judgement of the 
Executive branch in these matters. 
143. In New York Times, the publication of sensitive documents about the United 
States' involvement in the Vietnam war could have had an intpact on national security 
or foreign relations. In the Progressive case, publication of previously secret details on 
how to make a hydrogen bomb posed a very real threat to national security. In Webster, 
the firing of a CIA employee following a determination that his homosexuality posed a 
threat to security might have been rationally related to national security when the CIA 
had determined that personal secrets like that of homosexuality can be exploited by 
enemy agents. 
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standard of review to the issues of justiciability and constitutionality.144 
In practice however, these tests will merge into one. 
B. Is the Restraint Constitutional? 
The government has advanced several arguments rebutting the 
constitutional challenges made by Kam and Bernstein. The State 
Department has argued that the licensing scheme restrains non-expressive 
conduct rather than speech, making a First Amendment regulation of 
speech analysis inappropriate.145 The State Department has also 
argued that it regulates the source code because of its functional 
capabilities rather than because of any ideas or beliefs expressed in the 
code, 146 essentially arguing that the restraint is content-neutral.147 
The first argument, centering around the issue of whether source code 
is speech, is discussed irI the followirig Part. 
I. The Nature of Source Code: Is it "Speech" or "Conduct?" 
The court in Kam expressly avoided ruling on the issue of whether 
computer source code by itself is speech for purposes of constitutional 
analysis.148 The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amend-
ment protections of speech and of the press are not subject to a literal 
readirig and were meant to include other modes of expression.149 
Recognizirig that all acts of speaking are imbued with some element of 
144. See infra Part m.B.2. 
145. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 
1996). 
146. Karn, Points & Authorities, supra note 8, at 23. 
147. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1436-37 (defendants urging the adoption of the 
O'Brien content-neutral standard); Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 
I, 10 (D.D.C. 1996) (court accepted defendant's contention that regulations are content-
neutral). 
148. Kam, 925 F. Supp. at 27 n.19. For pwposes of its discussion the Kam court 
assumed that source code together with programmer's comments would qualify as 
speech. The computer disks at issue in Kam contained source code for cryptographic 
algorithms found in the companion book APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY. The disks also 
contained, interspersed with the source code, explanatory comments in a form readable 
by humans, infonnation that would be ignored by a computer running the code, but 
helpful to a person studying the code. Id. at 26. Because the disks contained both source 
code and "comments" the court was willing to assume that the contents of the disk were 
speech for purposes of constitutional analysis, without ruling on the constitutional status 
of the source code itse1£ 
149. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) 
(addressing the applicability of the First Amendment to motion pictures, the Court wrote, 
"Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than the public speech, 
the radio, the stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First Amendment draws no 
distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas.") (emphasis added). 
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conduct, the Court has extended First Amendment protection to 
expressive conduct, but declined to extend the full protection of the First 
Amendment to non-expressive conduct.1so 
In both Bernstein and Kam, the State Department asserted that 
cryptographic source code was not "speech," but rather non-expressive 
conduct that is not afforded any protection under the First Amend-
ment.1st From these cases, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
determination whether an encryption export regulation impinges on 
speech or conduct requires consideration of the following factors: ( a) the 
medium of recordation; (b) the act of exporting and the "conduct'' of 
delivering a message; ( c) the nature of source code; and ( d) the rationale 
for regulating encryption. 
a. Medium of Recordation 
In answering Karo's CJRs, the State Department granted permission 
to export a book that contained the very same encrypting algorithms 
found on the companion computer disk.152 The only difference 
between the contents of the disk and the corresponding contents of the 
printed materials was the medium on which they were recorded.153 It 
appears that the State Department decided to treat the disk differently 
because of the difference in medium ofrecordation. In a similar fashion, 
the Department of Commerce has adopted a rule that treats encryption 
recorded in print differently from encryption recorded in any other 
medium.154 Analytically, one must begin by deciding whether bits of 
data, encoded on a magnetic medium such as a computer disk qualify as 
150. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402 (1989)"(Justice Brennan noting that, as 
a threshold issue, the Court must "first detennine whether [defendant] Johnson's flag 
burning constituted expressive conduct, pennitting him to invoke the First Amendment 
in challenging his conviction") ( emphasis added). 
151. Bernstein v. United States Dep'tofState, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 
1996); Kam, Points & Authorities, supra note 8, at 13. 
152. Kam, 925 F. Supp. at 3. 
153. Letter dated December 5, 1994 from Kenneth C. Bass, m and Thomas J. 
Cooper (Karo's attorneys) to Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary, Department of 
State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (visited Feb. 8, 1998) 
<http://www.people.qualcomm/kam/export/mcnamara_appeal.html/> • 
154. Encrypting software that would otherwise be subject to the EAR licensing 
scheme is exempt from the export review requirements if it is distributed in print as a 
book. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.3, Notes to Paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) (1997). 
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"speech." If they do not, they are not eligible for the protection of the 
First Amendment.155 
It would seem that printed words do not lose their character as speech 
once they are recorded in a machine-readable medium such as a 
computer disk. Were Mr. Bernstein or Mr. Karn to stand on a street 
comer and hand out copies of the Communist Manifesto to passersby, 
their actions would constitute "speech" for purposes of constitutional 
analysis. If they were to print the Manifesto in a foreign language like 
French or German, the degree of protection to which they would be 
entitled should not change.156 Likewise, the protected status of the 
publication should not change if the Manifesto were contained on an 
audio cassette, microfiche, or on a computer diskette. 
In the case of the Manifesto being printed in a foreign language, the 
mere fact that its words are unintelligible to many would-be readers does 
not take away from the fact that it is still speech. Likewise, reading the 
Manifesto onto an audio cassette, printing it on microfiche, or typing it 
onto a diskette should not remove the document from the realm of 
"speech" merely because the document is unintelligible to the unaided 
ear or eye. Courts should accord all recorded information the same 
degree of protection whether memorialized on paper, microform, audio 
cassette or computer disk. The fact that the source code in Kam is 
recorded on a computer diskette does not make the information 
something other than speech. Similarly, the encrypting source code on 
Professor Junger's Web page should be treated as speech, even though 
the data exists as a string of ls and Os in the ephemeral realm of 
cyberspace.157 In addition to finding support in constitutional law 
decisions, another area of law supports the conclusion that information 
imprinted on a computer diskette is "speech."158 
United States copyright law regards computer source code as a 
"literary work."159 Congress defined literary works as ''works, other 
I SS. This initial inquiry focuses on whether information recorded on a computer 
disk can ever be considered "speech" for First Amendment purposes. The content of the 
information, which might be anything from Shakespeare to a spreadsheet program, is 
irrelevant to this inquiry. The issue of content is addressed infra in Part III.B.1.c. 
156. The right to speak foreign languages is likely protected under the 14th 
Amendment's implicit guarantee of the right of"privacy." See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (protecting the right to teach a foreign language). The Ninth 
Circuit has taken this even further, striking down a provision of the Arizona Constitution 
which made English the official State language. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official 
English, 69 F.3d 920, 934-35 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
117 S. Ct JOSS (1997). 
157. For a description of Mr. Junger's case, see supra note 110. 
158. 17 u.s.c. §§ 101-1101 (1994). 
159. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1994). 
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than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or 
numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material 
objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phono records, film, 
tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied."160 When it passed 
the Copyright Act in 1976, Congress had the foresight to extend 
copyright protection to any medium of recordation then known, and to 
any recording medium later developed.161 Thus, it is clear that the Act 
extends copyright protection based on the content of the literary work, 
and not based on the author's chosen medium of recordation. 
In Bernstein, the court analogized speech protected by the First 
Amendment to literary works protected under copyright law. The court 
noted that copyright law does not protect an idea itself, but rather the 
expression of that idea; just as the First Amendment protects the 
expression of ideas. The expression protected "connotes the 'speaking' 
of an idea."162 The court went on to note that, "[w]hile copyright and 
First Amendment law are by no means coextensive, and the analogy 
between the two should not be stretched too far, copyright law does lend 
support to the conclusion that source code is a means of original 
expression," and as such should be regarded as "speech" for purposes of 
constitutional analysis.163 It would seem then, that data recorded in an 
electronic medium like a computer disk would ordinarily be entitled to 
the full protection of the First Amendment. In certain instances, 
however, certain media have unique traits such that increased govern-
mental regulation is permitted where identical regulations would not 
stand in other media.164 Whether computer disks or other machine-
readable media have such traits is the second issue that must be 







Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 
163. Id. 
164. Red Lion Broad Co. v. Fed. Communications Connn'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390-92 
(1969) (holding that the FCC may require broadcasters to provide equal time for 
opposing political views because the useable range of broadcast frequencies is limited); 
but see Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 51 (1961) ("I am aware of no 
constitutional principle which permits us to hold that the communication ofideas through 
one medium may be censored while other media are immune.") (Warren, C.J., 
dissenting); see also supra note 143. 
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In Kam, the government had argued that computer disks carrying 
source code are functionally different from books containing source 
code.165 The source code on Kara's diskette could be read by a 
computer, run through a compiler, and turned into object code in a few 
short steps.166 Turning the source code in the book Applied Cryptog-
raphy into operating object code required the additional step of entering 
the source code into a computer, either by typing or scanning the text of 
the book. The government argued that because Karo's disks facilitated 
the process of creating working encryption, the disks could be regulated 
in a way that might not be allowed for print media.167 
It is undeniable that the information contained on the disks could be 
converted to a working program more easily than the information 
contained in print. However, there ought not to be anything magical 
about data on disks. In Red Lion, the Court focused on the scarcity of 
the broadcast frequencies. 168 This scarcity required that the airwaves 
be regulated in a way that print media need not be. At the time, it was 
thought that no other medium could fairly substitute for radio and 
television broadcasting.169 There are no traits that inhere in computer 
disks that are analogous to broadcasting in terms of scarcity or 
uniqueness. Information in print can easily be converted to computer-
readable data and electronic media can easily be converted to print. The 
greater the ease of this conversion, the more the two media ought to be 
treated in a similar fashion. Ultimately, the impact of the medium of 
recordation should be measured when considering the applicability of the 
national security override, discussed infra in Part ffi.D. When one 
medium is only a whisper away from transformation into the second 
medium, the national security analysis for one should suffice for both. 
However, where a great deal of time, effort, skill or expense is required 
to transform information embodied in one medium to another medium, 
the national security analysis taken up in Part ffi.D. infra should be 
bifurcated.170 
165. Kam v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 1996). 
166. Presumably, Karn intended tbat purchasers of his source code companion disks 
would run tbrough this process to obtain working encryption. For an explanation of the 
relationship between source code and operational software, see supra note 52. 
167. Declaration of William P. Crowell, Deputy Director of National Security 
Agency (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://people.qualcomm.com/kam/export/crowell.html> 
( detailing tbe functional differences between in-print source code and the source code 
on tbe Karn disk). 
168. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 389-92. 
169. Technology, with tbe proliferation of cable television and the Internet, has 
since proven tbe Court's concerns to be unfounded. 
170. A simple example illustrates this point. Imagine someone offering for sale (I) 
copies of a high quality photograph of a $100 bill, and (2) sets of printing plates 
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In this case, the information contained in print can be transformed into 
a machine-readable format through typing, scanning, or even through 
computer voice dictation. The source code algorithms in Applied 
Cryptography, though numerous, are not lengthy and could likely be 
reproduced in their entirety in a few hours. No significant degree of 
skill is required for this transformation. As a result of the close 
proximity of print media and machine-readable media, the two should be 
treated the same. If one medium is protected by the First Amendment, 
so too should the other be protected. The medium of recordation by 
itself cannot stand as grounds on which the government's actions may 
find support in this case. 
b. The Act of Exporting 
At issue in both Bernstein and Kam is the right to export informa-
tion.171 The Department of State, in its Memorandum of Points and 
engraved with the same image. In response to this person's marketing efforts, the 
government seeks an injunction on the grounds that the images for sale can be used to 
counterfeit US currency. The salesman offers the First Amendment as the basis for his 
defense. Both the photograph and the engraved plates render the same images. 
However, while it is clear that an injunction barring the sale of the plates may well be 
granted, it is not clear that the sale of the photographs will enjoined as well. One 
possible reason for this disparate treatment is the degree of skill and effort that is 
required to produce the plates. The photographs are not easily converted to printing 
plates. Imagine now that the same person is selling computer disks containing a scanned 
version of the photograph. The photograph can easily be converted to a machine-
readable format with a common scanner, available in homes, offices, copy shops, and 
schools. Although the scanned image could be used to counterfeit currency on a 
computer while the photograph by itself is of little use to a counterfeiter, the propriety 
of the injunction for the photograph and the disks should be decided together. If the 
scanned image can be easily used to create counterfeit currency, then the sale of the 
disks as well as the photograph should be enjoined. Likewise, if the photograph is 
protected by the First Amendment, so too should be the disks since orle is so easily 
transformed into the other. 
171. In Junger, the apparent intent of the petitioner was merely to make his class 
materials available over the Internet, an act which was considered an "export'' under the 
EAR since foreign parties could access this information. See supra note 112 and 
accompanying text For the purposes of this discussion, "export'' does not necessarily 
mean transactions engaged in for profit The AECMI' AR regulations do not distinguish 
between commercial activities and non-commercial activities; they are applied without 
discrimination to Mr. Bernstein's and Mr. Junger's academic "exports" and Mr. Kam's 
commercial "exports." For purposes of constitutional analysis, Mr. Kam's sale of the 
diskettes did not, by placing his activity in the commercial realm, automatically limit 
applicability of First Amendment protections to his speech. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 ("books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold 
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Authorities seeking to have Karo's case dismissed, implies that the act 
of exporting is conduct unrelated to speaking and is therefore not entitled 
to First Amendment protection.172 By arguing that the export controls 
do not restrict expression, but rather merely restrict an act (exporting), 
the government draws a distinction between speaking and the act of 
exporting. Although speaking and exporting are not the same, neither 
are the two mutually exclusive. The speech/conduct distinction brought 
up by the State Department does not tum on the act of exportation. 
Communicating to an audience abroad is generally within the scope 
of the First Amendment.173 However, if international communication 
threatens national security, the First Amendment does not protect it.174 
Courts have also upheld restraints based on national security that were 
imposed on media with a primarily domestic circulation, presumably 
aimed at a primarily domestic audience.175 It appears then that the 
audience to which the speech is directed is not as important as the 
content of the speech, because threats to national security exist both 
domestically and abroad.176 The issue of whether encrypting source 
code endangers national security is taken up in Part III.D., infra. 
Every act of "speaking" necessarily contains some elements of 
conduct. Forcing air across one's vocal chords or distributing a 
newspaper are both forms of conduct, but are also necessary antecedents 
to the act of "speaking." "Speaking'' cannot be completed without the 
ability to deliver one's message, whether it be vocally or through a more 
elaborate distribution scheme. 
For example, all newspapers employ some sort of delivery process to 
get the news from the printing presses to the newsstand. Suppose that 
the government permitted news gathering, writing and publication, but 
prohibited the distribution of newspapers. Clearly, such a regulation 
would have the effect of quashing the freedom of the press, even thou'h 
it was aimed only at the non-communicative conduct of distribution. 77 
for profit [but that] does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty 
is safeguarded by the First Amendment''). 
172. "Control over • . • [ encryption source code] export does not restrict expression, 
but [rather] the conduct of exporting a functioning defense article." Kam, Points & 
Authorities, supra note 8, at 6. 
173. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1988)(noting that 
First Amendment protection is the same when speech is aimed abroad as when it is 
aimed a domestic audience). 
174. Id. See also infra Part III.D. 
175. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D, Wisc. 1979). 
176. The advent of home-grown terrorism like the bombings in Oklahoma City and 
Atlanta supports this contention. 
177. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 762-69 (1988); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482 (1965) ("The right of freedom of speech and 
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The EAR/ITAR regulations essentially function on this level, permitting 
scientists, mathematicians and others to research, write and publish 
scientific and technical data in the United States, while prohibiting 
distribution beyond our borders through certain channels without first 
obtaining a censor's stamp of approval. 
The First Amendment must carry with it an implied protection on the 
acts related to and necessary for expression.178 Recognizing this self-
evident principle, and recognizing that exportation of a writing is simply 
a method of delivering one's message to an audience abroad, it is 
apparent that an analysis of the constitutionality of the EAR/ITAR 
restraints should not turn on the act of exportation. The act of exporting 
should be entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment unless 
there is something in the content of the message that removes it from 
this protection. 
c. The Nature of Source Code 
Interpreting the scope of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
on a number of occasions deemed acts imbued with symbolic meaning 
to be within the aegis of the First Amendment.179 These symbolic 
acts, termed "expressive conduct," are protected by the Bill of Rights 
while acts devoid of expression are not. 180 
The Bernstein court noted that the expressive conduct test applied by 
the Court in Texas v. Johnson seemed to apply only "in the absence of 
the 'spoken or written word' ."181 Relying on language from Texas v. 
Johnson and Spence v. Washington,1!fl. the district court in Bernstein 
press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right 
to receive, [ and] the right to read • . . . Without those peripheral rights, the specific 
rights would be less secure.") 
178. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. 
179. See, e.g., Tinker v. De Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (protection for the 
wearing of a black armband to protest the Vietnam war); Spence v. Washington, 418 
U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974) (protection for the display of an American Flag with a peace 
symbol taped on it); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (protection for the 
burning of a flag outside of the Republican National Convention); but cf. California v. 
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (conduct of nude barroom dancing afforded only 
minimal First Amendment protection). 
180. Texas, 491 U.S. at 404. 
181. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 
1996) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404). 
182. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409. 
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opined that analysis of the communicative content of an act follows only 
after determining that the act was conduct and not speech: 
In the instant case, Bernstein's encryption system is written, albeit in 
computer language rather than in English. Furthermore, there is little about this 
functional writing to suggest it is more like conduct than speech. A computer 
program is so unlike flag burning and nude dancing that [the government's] 
reliance on conduct cases is misplaced. It would be convoluted indeed to 
characterize the snuffle system as conduct in order to determine how expressive 
it is when, at least formally, it appears to be speech.183 
Thus it appears that a court reviewing encryption export license 
determinations for source code need not involve itself in the question of 
whether the source code is expressive, so long as it is written. In Karn, 
the plaintiff recorded the source code on a computer diskette. Although 
Karn's source code was not recorded on paper, 184 it is a tenuous 
proposition to assert that written speech can be transformed into 
"conduct'' merely by recording it on a different medium. 
Attorneys for the State Department argued that the source code is a 
"functioning cryptographic product, [and] is not intended to convey a 
particular message" and therefore should be regarded as conduct rather 
than speech. 185 Attacking the philosophic underpinnings of the 
government's argument, the district court in Bernstein noted that the 
First Amendment protects functional speech. "Thus even if ... source 
code ... is essentially functional, that does not remove it from the realm 
of speech. Instructions, do-it-yourself manuals, recipes, even technical 
information about hydrogen bomb construction . . . are often purely 
functional; they are also speech."186 
The source codes at issue in Karn and Bernstein are essentially 
functional how-to manuals, enabling readers to talk in secret. As the 
Bernstein court noted, however, functional speech is entitled to the same 
protections as persuasive or communicative speech. 187 
In support of this contention, the Bernstein court cited United States 
v. Progressive, Inc.188 Not cited, but also on point are the watershed 
concurring opinions written for the ''Pentagon Papers" case in 1971:89 
183. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp at 1434-35. 
184. Mirroring their view of the Kam disk, the regulators of the commodity in 
Junger focussed on the fact that it was recorded in an electronic medium (a "Web page") 
and was accessible and viewable only with the aid of a computer. 
185. Id. at 1434. 
186. Id. at 1435. 
187. Id. Informative speech is protected as well. New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) ("The press was protected so that it could bare the 
secrets of government and inform the people.") (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
188. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
189. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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In both cases, the government sought an injunction to prevent the 
publication of informative articles.190 In neither case did the court so 
much as mention that the First Amendment defense raised by the 
publishers was inapplicable due to the informative rather than persuasive 
content of the articles. 
The proper inquiry in determining whether the EAR/ITAR regulations 
impinge on speech or conduct is not an analysis of the medium, 
message, or act of exporting. Rather, the proper inquiry should focus on 
the rationale behind continuing to regulate source code.191 In the past, 
courts have looked to the purpose of a particular regulation to determine 
whether the regulation impinges on conduct or expression.192 
2. Is the Regulation Content-Based or Content-Neutral? 
When a court faces a constitutional challenge to a regulation, "[t]he 
rationale for a regulation determines the level of scrutiny to be applied 
... [I]fthe regulation is content-based, the regulation will be 'presump-
tively invalid,' whereas if the regulation is content-neutral, then the 
government may justify the regulation if certain other criteria are 
met."193 Therefore, determining regulation rationale is central to the 
broader question of whether a restraint is constitutional. An example of 
a content-neutral restraint can be found in the case Clark v. Community 
for Creative Non-Violence. In Clark, a Washington, D.C. ordinance 
prohibited any camping in either Washington D.C. 's Lafayette Park or 
the Mall.194 A homeless rights activist group filed suit for infringe-
ment of its First Amendment rights when prevented from camping 
overnight in the Mall in protest of the plight of the homeless in 
America.195 In determining whether the ordinance amounted to an 
190. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (Y{.D. Wis. 1979) (how 
to build a hydrogen bomb); New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713 (information about the 
United States' incursions into Cambodia during the Vietnam War). 
191. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984) (to 
be valid, a regulation impinging on symbolic conduct must, inter alia, be unrelated to 
restricting speech and must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government 
interest. This standard suggests that intent is a relevant factor). 
192. Id.; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (noting that a Jaw that 
has the effect of suppressing speech may be unconstitutional if the government in fact 
sought to suppress free expression). 
193. R.A.V. v. St Paul, 505 U.S. 377,382 (1992). 
194. Clark, 468 U.S. at 290. 
195. Id. at 291-92. 
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unconstitutional restraint on expression, the Court analyzed the restraint 
as a time, manner or place restriction and applied a three-prong test.196 
To pass constitutional muster, the restraint must (1) be imposed without 
reference to the content of the speech, (2) serve a significant government 
interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and (3) leave 
available alternative means of communication.197 
In analyzing the first prong, the Court found that the prohibition was 
content-neutral, because anyone wishing to camp overnight was 
prohibited, regardless of the would-be camper's reason for wanting to 
spend the night.198 The Court found the ordinance, on its face and in 
its application, to be content-neutral.199 Surprisingly, the court in Kam 
found the ITAR restraints to be content-neutral. It is puzzling how the 
court made this determination when the EAR/ITAR restraints are, on 
their face, content-based regulations and it is the content of the source 
code (its strength) that created the controversy in the Kam case. 
In analyzing whether a restraint on speech is content-based, a court 
will look first to the face of the statute or rule in question. A finding 
that the regulation is facially content-based will render the regulation 
presumptively invalid.200 However, even if the regulation is found to 
be content-neutral on its face, a court will inquire into the intent of the 
drafters of the rule to determine if it was promulgated in a neutral tone 
but with suppression of certain content in mind. 
a. Facial Review 
If Bernstein or Karn had written source code for a tic-tac-toe game, 
presumably the State Department would not have imposed any restraints 
on the exportation of their wares. Likewise, if Kam or Bernstein had 
tried to export weak encrypting source code with a key length of less 
than 40 bits (symmetric), the Departments of State and Commerce would 
have granted them permission to export.201 However, because the 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 293. 
198. Clark, 468 U.S. 288, 295 n.6 (1984). 
199. Id. 
200. R.A. V. v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-403 (1992); City of Laude v. 
Gilleo, I 14 S. Ct 2038, 2047 (1994) ("With rare exceptions, content discrimination in 
regulations of ••• speech .•• is presumptively impennissible, and this presumption is 
a strong one.") (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
201. The State Department routinely permited "fast track" export of encrypting 
programs with key lengths under 40 bits symmetric and 512 bits asymmetric. Fahn, 
Export FAQ, supra note 22, at 6. The Commerce Department adopted a similar rule, 
permitting, without a license, export of keys under 40 or 512 bits. Interim Rule, supra 
note 22. 
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source code enabled readers to securely encrypt their communications, 
the State Department ruled that the items were subject to export 
restraints.202 In essence, the government is permitting a mathematician 
to utter ":X:" but not "x3 ." Just as in Clark where the regulation prohibit-
ed all camping, the government would have to seek to prohibit the 
export of all computer source code regardless of content in order for the 
EAR/ITAR restraints to be content-neutral. This is not what these 
regulations do. 
The Karn court held that the regulations are not content-based because 
the State Department is not regulating any expressive message contained 
on the disks. Explaining this rationale, the court noted that the 
government was not: 
regulating the export of the diskette because of the expressive content of the 
comments and or the source code, but instead [was] regulating [ export of the 
diskette] because of the belief that the combination of encryption source code 
on machine readable media will make it easier for foreign intelligence sources 
to encode their communications. 203 
The court appears to have argued on the fact that disks were not 
expressive in the sense that they did not reflect a political sentiment or 
attempt to persuade the reader of anything. Because the disk's contents 
are purely instructional, the Kam court seemed to conclude that the 
contents are not expressive and therefore the regulations are not content-
based. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the proposition, however, 
that a content-based regulation must restrict a particular viewpoint.204 
Rather than support the contention that the ITAR restraints are 
content-neutral, this line of reasoning lends support to the notion that 
they are content-based. If the purpose of the regulation is to control 
potentially dangerous non-persuasive communications, as the Kam court 
appears to suggest, then the regulation, on its face, purports to regulate 
202. Letter notifying Karn of State Department decision to classify the Applied 
Cryptography diskette as a munition (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://people. 
qualcomm.com/karn/export/floppy_cjr__response.html>. 
203. Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 30 (D.D.C. 1996) 
( empbasis added). 
204. In a case concerning politically controversial publications, the Court cited FCC 
v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1984) in support of 
the proposition that ''the First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends 
not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public 
discussion ofan entire topic." Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 
230 (1987). 
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certain content. This is not to say that all content-based regulations are 
unconstitutional,205 but rather that any regulation that probes content 
before determining applicability is content-based. Under the EAR/ITAR 
restraints, content is the determinative factor in deciding whether the 
petitioner may circulate the information abroad. The fact that the 
licensing scheme does not regulate persuasive or innocuous information 
illustrates the central role content plays in applying the regulation to 
would-be exporters. Furthermore, the argument that the EARIITAR 
restraints are content-based finds support in related case law. 
In United States v. Progressive, Inc. and New York Times Co. v. 
United States, the government sought to enjoin the publication of certain 
information on the grounds that publication would harm national 
security.206 In the face of those claims, the courts implicitly recog-
nized that the injunctions sought by the government were content-based, 
noting that the restrictions came before the court with a heavy presump-
tion against their validity.207 Recall that restraints on expression that 
are content-based are presumptively invalid,208 while restraints that are 
content-neutral will be subjected to a level of review akin to intermedi-
ate-level scrutiny.209 From the presumed invalidity, one can infer that 
the courts operated on the belief that the restraints were content-based 
rather than content-neutral. 
Likewise, the contents of the disk in Kam and the contents of the 
academic papers in Bernstein are the sources of contention in those 
cases. Just as it did in Progressive and New York Times, the Executive 
Branch in Kam and Bernstein alleges that publication of certain 
information will imperil national security.210 Isolating certain informa-
tion and then subjecting it to a governmental licensing scheme as done 
under the EARIITAR is plainly a restraint based on content. 
205. See infra Part IIl.D. for a discussion of permissible content-based restraints. 
206. United States v. Progressive Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (Jv.D. Wis. 1979) 
(infonnation about hydrogen bomb construction); New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713 (1971) (infonnation about United States' involvement in the bombing of 
Cambodia). 
201. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714; Progressive Inc., 461 F. Supp. at 992. 
208. See supra note 191. 
209. See, e.g. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (applying a least 
restrictive means test to a content-neutral law banning the burning of draft cards), 
210. The State Department's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Kam stated 
the sources of the government's concern over pennitting export of encryption. For an 
excerpt, see Karn, Points & Authorities, supra note 8 
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Even though a finding that a regulation is content-based on its face is 
enough to create a presumption of invalidity, a review of the possible 
intent motivating the promulgation of the current encryption regulations 
is revealing. Some observers have argued that the regulations have the 
incidental and possibly intentional effect of chilling speech over 
electronic media and enabling the implementation of a domestic 
encryption policy without debate or public participation.211 These 
allegations are explored in this Part. 
In determining the rationale for the continuing regulation of encryp-
tion, the court should first look to the stated purpose of the regulation 
and assess how controlling that particular commodity supports the goal 
of the regulation. If the regulation does not appear to accord with the 
purpose of the Act, then the court should do more than scratch the 
surface to see if an ulterior motive exists.212 
Congress announced the purpose of the AECA in the first subsection 
of the Act as "furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign 
policy of the United States."213 The State Department included 
encryption technologies on the USML when it first promulgated the 
ITAR during the cold war in 1977. In doing so, it appears that the State 
Department was acting in furtherance of the stated goal of the AECA. 
The purpose of the EAA is generally to encourage exports from the 
United States, permitting the imposition of export controls only when 
they are necessary to protect national security, foreign policy, or supply 
objectives.214 Any export controls promulgated under the authority of 
the BAA must "clearly further" one of these objectives.215 
211. Whitehouse Off Base on Encryption Controls, SEATTI.E TIMES, July 18, 1996, 
atB4. 
212. Commenting on the need for judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, 
"[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the 
accomplishment of objectives not entrusted to the government ..• such an [enactment 
would not be] the law of the land." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
423 (1819). Though Marshall's statement addressed Congressional acts, his reasoning 
seems equally applicable to the acts of administrative agencies, particularly when they 
are acting in a quasi-legislative (and certainly unforeseeable) capacity. 
213. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (1994). 
214. 50 U.S.C. § 2402(2), (10) (1991 supp. 1997). 
215. Id. 
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President Clinton shifted control over dual-use encryption to the 
Commerce Department with reference to an earlier executive order 
promulgated in 1994.216 This earlier executive order established a state 
of emergency arising from "unrestricted access of foreign ~arties" to 
certain American high technology goods and technical data.2 7 Clinton 
concluded in the 1994 order that in order to deal with this problem of 
foreign access, the continuation of the EAA and the EAR would be 
necessary to protect the national security, foreign policy and the 
economy of the United States.218 The 1996 Executive Order transfer-
ring control over encryption to the Commerce Department states that the 
transfer is being made as an additional remedial step to deal with the 
national emergency first declared in 1994. Thus, the ~tated purpose for 
the transfer of control over encryption to the Commerce Department is 
to protect national security.219 
In 1977, encryption was used exclusively for military applications, 
enabling armies to communicate in code without fear of strategies being 
intercepted by the enemy. This fear of a diminution in foreign 
surveillance capabilities initially prompted the State Department to 
include encrypting technologies on the USML.220 In including encryp-
tion technologies on the USML at that time, the State Department was 
acting in furtherance of the stated intent of the AECA. 
However, in the nearly 20 years since the promulgation of the ITAR, 
strong encryption technology has spread far beyond the borders of the 
United States. Likewise, the uses of encryption have spread far beyond 
military applications.221 The changes in the availability and use of 
encryption have seemingly frustrated the purpose of the AECA and the 
EAA with respect to controlling encrypting source code. 
216. President Clinton's orderrefers to Exec. Order No. 12924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43437 
(1994). Clinton Order, supra note 50. 
217. Exec. Order No. 12924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43437 (1994). 
218. Id. 
219. This is justification is somewhat curious because the Commerce Department 
controls are marginally more relaxed than the State Department controls were. Most 
probably, the government made the transfer in order to loosen the controls over 
encryption somewhat, but did not wish to surrender its power to exercise full control, i.e. 
block all exports of encryption when it wished to. The declaration that the purpose of 
the transfer was related to national security may have the effect of keeping full control 
over encryption in the President's hands. 
220. Kam, Points & Authorities, supra note 8. If other nations' communications 
were encrypted, the United States would no longer be able to monitor activities inside 
foreign states. At the time that encryption technology was first banned from export, the 
State Department and the NSA shared the concern that permitting the export of high-
grade encryption technology would enable foreign governments to encode their 
communications securely and foil our intelligence efforts. 
221. SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at xv. 
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PGP offers military-grade protection and is currently available outside 
the United States over the Internet free of charge.222 Magazines and 
newspapers have reported widely on cases of forei~ nationals using 
POP to digitally cloak their criminal enterprises. Furthermore, 
encrypting source code is also available abroad in print and can easily 
be converted into machine-readable code. Any sufficiently motivated 
individual could easily purchase a book, such as Applied Cryptography, 
that contains encrypting source codes and algorithms printed inside. 
With this information the person could then type or scan the contents 
into a computer. In a very short time, he or she could transform 
information available in print into fully functional military-grade 
encryption. 
Any person who obtains a copy of a computer file in the United States 
can easily post the file on a computer for international distribution. This 
was done with the POP program when Zimmerman, the inventor, gave 
copies away to friends in United States and the program found its way 
all across the globe.224 The ease with which computer files can be 
transferred, copied, and made available over the Internet makes it 
difficult to believe that any valuable computer file located in the United 
States and widely available for domestic distribution will stay in the 
United States for any length of time. It is akin to saying that a secret 
printed in a nationally circulated newspaper will remain secret outside 
the United States after distribution. 
Furthermore, the restraints in place in many applications designed to 
prevent unauthorized access or disclosure to foreign nationals appear 
ineffectual. These restraints typically take the form of requiring the user 
to accept certain restrictions as a condition of using the software. The 
user accepts by "clicking," after reading the terms, on a button labeled 
"I accept'' at the bottom of the computer screen.225 The reality is that 
222. See supra notes 33, 35. 
223. See supra note 35; infra note 294. 
224. Government Drops Zimmerman PGP Prosecution, NBWSBYTES NBWS 
NETWORK, Jan. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, PAPERS File. 
225. The following is the text of the tenns and conditions of use presented to the 
user installing Netscape, a popular Web browser with built-in encrypting capabilities: 
Except for export to Canada for use in Canada, by Canadian citizens, the 
software and any underlying technology may not be exported outside of the 
United States or to any foreign entity or "foreign person" as defined by United 
States government regulations, including without limitations, anyone who is 
not a citizen, national or lawful permanent resident of the United States. By 
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users of computer software are routinely presented with terms and 
conditions of use and likely click "I accept'' without ever reading the 
terms. These "agreements" are essentially digital contracts of adhesion 
equivalent to pages of fine print that make up today's widely used form 
contracts. Even the most diligent users are pressed to take the time to 
examine these agreements line-by-line. As a result, even well-meaning 
users may be unaware of the terms agreed to that prohibit distribution 
abroad. 
Furthermore, no manageable controls are in place to prevent sending 
software over phone lines or carrying computer disks across borders in 
baggage. Based on the ease with which a person in the United States 
can send software abroad virtually instantaneously,226 and considering 
the documented fact that military-grade encryption is already available 
outside the United States, it is doubtful that the regulation of encrypting 
source code substantially advances any purpose related to the stated 
goals of the AECA or the EAA. 
Almost certainly, advances in microprocessor technology will, at some 
point in the future, make today's safest algorithms vulnerable to 
attack.227 Let us say, for argument sake, that by the year 2020, 
cracking a 1248-bit PGP key will be possible in a reasonable amount of 
time. Let us also say that presently only three encrypting algorithms 
exist: PGP (maximum length key of 1248 bits), ABC (maximum length 
key of 1248 bits), and XYZ (maximum length key of 2000 bits). 
At present, PGP is already widely available throughout the world 
while neither ABC nor XYZ is widely distributed. If POP has no 
weaknesses or backdoors,228 the earliest that the government can 
downloading or using the software, you are agreeing to the foregoing and you 
are warranting that you are not a "foreign person" or under the control of a 
foreign person. 
Display at the end of the Netscape installation process (copy on file with author). 
Netscape's URL is <http://home.netscape.com/>. 
226. One Web site offers visitors the chance to engage in a bit of civil disobedience 
by pulling an enciyption signature file into the United States from Anguilla and then re-
exporting the file back out to Anguilla. This simple act violates enczyption export 
regulations (visited April 2, 1997) <http://online.offshore.com.ai/aans-trafficker/>. 
227. See supra note 23. Commenting on IBM's newly announced ''unbreakable" 
encryption scheme, one industry expert commented, "Just because something is 
unbreakable today doesn't mean it's going to be unbreakable in the year 2000." Ed 
Golden, IBM Encryption Scheme Holds Significant Promise, INFOWORLD, May 12, 1997, 
at 21. 
228. Zimmeanan, inventor of PGP, has made the source code available for public 
inspection. It is regarded as the closest thing to military-grade enczyption that is 
available in the public domain. SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 437. A "backdoor" is a 
secret entrance, intentionally or accidentally created, that peanits those aware of its 
existence to crack codes easily without going through the time and effort of a "brute 
force" attack. See supra, note 18. 
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expect to crack a PGP key is the year 2020. The same is true for ABC 
since it shares the same 1248-bit key length.229 However, the govern-
ment will not be able to crack XYZ with its longer key until some time 
after the year 2020. 
In this scenario, efforts to control the export of either PGP or ABC 
would not serve to protect national security since PGP is already 
available internationally, is easily replicable, and because ABC offers no 
better protection than does PGP. However, regulation of XYZ, which 
is not already widely available, could serve to protect national security 
since it provides an additional period of security, during which XYZ-
encrypted messages could be read. Applying this illustration to the facts 
of Karn and Bernstein, it follows that any efforts to control the export 
of encryption systems no stronger than PGP, or any of the algorithms 
already in circulation (for example, those in Part V of Applied Cryptog-
raphy), do not serve to protect national security in any meaningful way. 
Essentially, the genie has been let out of the bottle with the release of 
PGP, the publication of Applied Cryptography, and the spread of other 
encryption algorithms across the Internet. As a result, continuing to 
regulate the export of all encryption stronger than 40 bits (symmetric) 
does not serve to protect the nation's security. Those most likely to get 
caught in the web of these export restrictions are those least likely to 
pose a threat to the United States. Considering how easily one can 
obtain encrypting software over the Internet and how widely Internet 
users have distributed the program, it appears that any motivated person 
can obtain a copy of PGP anywhere in the world.230 
Weighing the governmental interests, the realities of global access to 
encryption, and the increasing need for strong encryption on the Internet, 
a committee consisting of members of the National Research Council, 
the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of 
Engineering (the Committee) recently released a report calling for the 
freer use of encryption.231 The report considered law enforcement and 
national security dilemmas posed by cryptography and concluded that 
"on balance, the advantages of more widespread use of cryptography 
229. If ABC has any weaknesses or previously unknown backdoors, it may be 
possible to crack the code much earlier than the year 2020. 
230. See supra note 35. 
231. Committee Recommendations, supra note 48. 
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outweigh the disadvantages."232 Addressing the issue of export 
controls, the Committee found that because of its nature, it is difficult 
to monitor and control the export of software.233 The Committee 
further found that as encryption proliferates, traditional monitoring of 
foreign partiesj communications will become increasingly difficult.234 
Thus, the inexorable increase in use of encryption will substantially 
frustrate the government's ability to protect national security through 
encryption export regulations. The Committee's findings cast doubt on 
the wisdom of continuing to regulate encrypting software. They also 
make observers wonder about the real rationale for continuing to restrict 
source code exports. 
Considering that military grade encryption is already available free of 
charge outside the United States and may be easily sent, albeit illegally, 
via phone lines or post to foreign nationals, continued regulation of 
encryption for the national security reasons seems futile. However, 
continuing the regulation of encryption may serve other purposes. 
The EAR/ITAR regulations have had an impact on the strength of 
domestically available encryption.235 Many popular word processors, 
spread sheets, and Internet "Web browsers" have built-in encrypting 
capabilities. The Committee found that restraints on encryption 
exportation have led many software manufacturers to save the cost of 
producing a high grade version for domestic use and a low grade version 
for export by simply producing one version compatible with the lowest 
common denominator.236 The result has been that much of the 
commercial encryption available in the United States is weak.237 
Since 1993, the Clinton Administration has tried to promulgate a 
national encryption standard which will preserve law enforcement's 
ability to wire tap and monitor electronic communications.238 After 
two failed proposals, President Clinton has tried a third time to create a 
national enc~tion policy. Observers have dubbed this third proposal 
"Clipper ill." 9 In the years since the first proposal, no market-led 
232. Id. at 6. 
233. Id. at 8. 
234. "In the long tenn, as the use of encryption grows worldwide, it is probable that 
national capability to conduct traditional signals intelligence against foreign parties will 
be diminished." Id. 
235. See supra notes 46, 48, 49 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra note.46 and accompanying text 
237. See generally Charles L. Evans, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software: 
Efforts to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to 
Compete in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C.J. INT'L LAW & COM. REG. 469 (1994) (discussing 
the impact of the ITAR regulations on the U.S. software industry). 
238. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text 
239. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text 
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standard has emerged as the clear favorite.240 This is not because the 
technology and the demand do not exist. It is the result of the software 
industry's inability to produce a single strong encryption standard for 
domestic and international sale. Additionally, for the sender and receiver 
to communicate, both must use the same encrypting algorithm. With the 
expansion of the Internet and electronic communications, users of the 
Internet are crossing borders with increasing frequency, communicating 
with the person next door one minute, exchanging ideas with someone 
on another continent the next. A strong encrypting program in use in 
the United States offers little or no protection when communicating with 
another using different or weaker technology. In short, the privacy 
offered by encryption is only as good as the weakest link in the chain 
of communication. The EAR/ITAR regulations have forged such a weak 
link. 
By continuing to restrict the export of encrypting software, the Clinton 
Administration has essentially bought time for itself while it reworks its 
unpopular Clipper encryption system proposal. The regulation of 
encryption has had the incidental and possibly intentional effect of 
chilling speech and retarding the emergence of an international 
encryption standard. Considering the wide international availability of 
encryption, the continued regulation of encrypting source code that is 
already published and publicly available either in America or abroad 
fails to advance the stated purposes of the AECA or the EAA in any 
significant way.241 Furthermore, it appears that the continuing regula-
tion of encryption source code discourages citizens from communicating 
freely and transacting commercially over the Internet.242 Effects of 
240. The DES, PGP, and RSA cryptosystems are the closest to being international 
standards for encryption, DES was considered the ''worldwide standard" in 1994. 
SCIINEIER, supra note 12 at 219. RSA is thought to be the most popular public key 
cryptosystem in the world. SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 281-82. For evidence of the 
worldwide popularity of PGP, see supra note 35. Nevertheless, licensing and ex{lort of 
these systems is restricted because all of them operate at more than 40 or 512 bits. 
241. Regulation of newly developed encryption that is stronger than that which is 
already available internationally would seem to advance the stated goals of the EAA and 
the AECA to protect and preserve national security. 
242. Internet Commerce Hung up on Security, 4 EDI NEWS, Feb. 19, 1996, 
available in LEXIS, MARKET Library, IACNEWS File. 
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these kinds strongly suggest an impact on speech that the Constitution 
does not permit.243 
C. Availability of Judicial Review 
Even if the EAR/ITAR regulations are otherwise valid content-based 
prior restraints working to protect national security, the regulations must 
provide a mechanism for prom~t judicial review in order to make the 
prohibition of publication final. 44 
Both the ITAR and the EAR regulations purport, on their face, to 
permit no judicial review. The AECA expressly bars judicial review 
under the APA. The only remaining cause of action for the aggrieved 
exporter is to assert that her constitutional rights have been violated. 
Thus although the AECA does not provide a cause of action or a judicial 
review process, the Constitution ensures at least a minimal level of 
protection from the censor's pen. 
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) provides for a greater 
level of judicial review than the AECA.245 However, Executive Order 
13,026 specifically exempts sections 4(c) and 6(h)(2)-(4) of the 
EAA.246 The Order states that permitting judicial review could imperil 
national security and jeopardize ''foreign policy interests."247 Of 
course, this is ultimately an issue for a court to decide under the political 
question doctrine. However, neither the ITAR nor the EAR purport to 
provide a process for judicial review of the government's act of 
censorship. In fact, the Executive Branch has attempted to impose 
hurdles to judicial review by invoking the defense of national security. 
In Freedman v. Maryland, the Court addressed a film licensing 
scheme that worked as a prior restraint, and required that procedural 
safeguards be implemented to ensure that the scheme did not run afoul 
of the First Amendment. The Court required that the government bear 
the burden of proof to justify the restraint, that the request for a license 
be handled in a brief period of time, and that the denial of a license 
should not become effective until the government agent seeking the 
restraint had gone to court and received an injunction.248 In the case 
243. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); United 
States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
244. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 
(1965); Hague v. C.1.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
245. The AP A creates a presumption ofa right to judicial review. This preswnption 
can be overridden only by express language in a statute. See supra Part Ill.A. 
246. Clinton Order, supra note 50, at § I. 
247. Id. 
248. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59. 
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of a prior restraint and injunction barring the distribution of obscene 
printed materials, the Court held that the injunction would only be valid 
if similar procedural safeguards were in place.249 Among the required 
safeguards was the right to prompt judicial review of the injunction. 
Although the Maryland censorship law in Freedman provided for 
appeal to the state courts, the Court held that this process was too time 
consuming.250 The Court expressed concern that as the aggrieved 
party sought judicial review in the state court Wistem, the censor's 
determination, in practice, would become final.2 1 To prevent this 
from happening, the Court required that any attempt at censorship be 
approved by a court shortly after the initial review. Expressing his 
concern over the censor's insensitivity toward the First Amendment, 
Justice Brennan wrote: 
[O]nly a judicial detennination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary 
sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring judicial 
determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. To this end, the 
exhibitor must be assured [that] the censor will, within a specified brief period, 
either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film. Any restraint 
imposed in advance of a final judgment determination on the merits must 
similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed 
period compatible with sound judicial resolution.252 
Similar procedural safeguards should be implemented in the case of 
export licensing regulations. The danger of unchecked governmental 
censorship is just as great in the case of export licenses as it is in the 
case of film exhibition licenses. Like the Maryland statute in Freedman, 
the !TAR and EAR regulations do not provide for any sort of expedited 
judicial review before the licensing determinations become final. In fact, 
both regulatory schemes purport to prohibit all judicial review. In light 
of the requirement that speech licensing schemes must provide an avenue 
for prompt judicial review, it would seem that the EAR and !TAR 
schemes are facially unconstitutional.253 
249. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1957). 
250. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59-61 (1965). 
251. Id. at 58. 
252. Id. 
253. President Carter's Assistant Attorney General, John M. Hannon, came to a 
similar conclusion in a memorandum analyzing the constitutionality of the IT AR 
encryption regulations. Interestingly, at the time this memo was written, encryption bad 
no commercial applications and was strictly of interest to mathematicians and spies. 
John M. Hannon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Constitutionality 
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D. Countervailing National Security Concerns 
Once a court has determined that source code is speech, and that the 
EAR/ITAR restraints are content-based, its next inquiry must be whether 
encrypting source code is protected speech. Although the First 
Amendment provides substantial protection for freedom of speech, it is 
well established that this right is not absolute.254 Prior restraints are 
constitutionally permissible in certain instances.255 In a 1931 decision 
that struck down a state prior restraint for libel, Chief Justice Hughes 
noted that, "[First Amendment] protection even as to a previous [prior] 
restraint is not absolutely unlimited."256 Justice Hughes went on to 
articulate some of the "exceptional" cases in which a prior restraint 
would be permissible. These cases include utterances that hinder a 
country's war effort (such as publishing the number and location of 
troops), publishing obscene material, and publicly using words which 
incite violence.257 The narrowly articulated instances led the Supreme 
Court later to coin the oft-repeated phrase in Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 
"[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court 
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."258 
Although the court in Bantam Books was addressing a Rhode Island 
statute regulating obscene and indecent publications, two years later the 
Court noted that its statement in Bantam Books applied as well to "other 
forms of expression." 259 
In specifically citing troop locations and military transport sailing 
dates as examples of information the expression of which the First 
Amendment does not protect, Justice Hughes carved out a class of 
speech not entitled to First Amendment protection: a class of speech 
consisting of words or utterances that imperil national security. 
Although Chief Justice Hughes' list was not meant to be exclusive, it 
suggests the severity and certainty of a threat that must exist for a prior 
restraint to be constitutional. Drawing from Near v. Minnesota, the 
Under the First Amendment of /TAR Restrictions on Public Cryptography, May 11, 
1978, reprinted in Burr.DING IN BIG BROTIIER, Tull CRYPTOGRAPlllC POLICY DEBATE 
543 (Lance J. Hoffman ed. 1994). 
254. See e.g., Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961). 
255. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931). 
256. Id. 
251. Id. at 716. 
258. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Freedman v. 
Mruyland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Unites States, 403 U.S. 713, 
714 (1971); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1319, 1324 (1975); R.A.V. v. St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992). 
259. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 57. 
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Court in United States v. New York Times expounded on the degree of 
certainty that the ~overnment must demonstrate to support a prior 
restraint on speech. 60 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized that the potential 
harm to national security posed by publication must be clear and certain, 
and cautioned that the First Amendment "tolerates absolutely no prior 
judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that 
untoward consequences may result."261 Justice Brennan further defined 
Chief Justice Hu§hes' requirement that publication would imperil 
national security:2 
[O]nly governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, 
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling 
the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an 
interim restraining order. In no event may mere conclusions be sufficient. 263 
Thus, Brennan required that certain and demonstrable harm be 
inevitable to justify prohibiting publication of materials allegedly posing 
a threat to national security. 
In 1979, eight years after the Supreme Court decided New York Times, 
the magazine The Progressive tried to publish technical information on 
the construction of the hydrogen bomb.264 The article, entitled "The 
H-bomb Secret. How We Got It, Why We're Telling It," contained both 
information already in the public domain and information previously 
260. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 713. 
261. Id. at 726. 
262. In Near, Justice Brennan noted that the cases thus far considered by the Court 
had indicated that a prior restraint is permissible only when the Nation is at war. Id. 
In the present case, the government may argue that the Nation is engaged in a war on 
terrorism, a war on drugs, or some other political hyperbole. Notwithstanding such 
rhetoric, the phrase "at war" appears to be a term of art in this context, referring to the 
state of war which can only be declared by Congress pursuant to Article I of the 
Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Any interpretation of the phrase less restrictive 
than this would permit the Executive Branch unilaterally to declare a national condition 
that could work to preempt certain civil liberties. The ''war on drugs" provides a good 
example, having been waged for nearly 30 years. President Nixon first declared a ''war 
on drugs" in 1969, and the Executive Branch's commitment to this ''war'' has since been 
actively reaffirmed by the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations. Nevertheless, this 
state of ''war" could not constitutionally justify abridgement of the due process rights of 
those accused of drug offenses. · 
263. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726-27 (emphasis added). 
264. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
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unavailable publicly.265 After reviewing affidavits submitted by 
experts and scientists, the court found that publication of the article 
would pose a threat to national security.266 One scientist appearing 
before the court stated that ''the design and operational concepts 
described in the manuscript are not expressed or revealed in public 
literature nor ... are they known to scientists not associated with the 
government weapons program."267 Based on evidence presented at 
trial including statements of this sort, the court concluded that publishing 
the article would be analogous to publication of troop movements or 
transport sailing dates.268 The Progressive court subsequently issued 
an injunction barring publication.269 
In the case of exporting encrypting source code, the government has 
put forth nothing more than conjecture or surmise about the deleterious 
effects that it alleges will be wrought by electronic publication and 
distribution.27° Considering that the cat is out of the bag with respect 
to the international availability of military-grade encryption, the State 
Department in Karn and Bernstein has not yet met the high burden of 
proof required by the Court under New York limes. 
Publication and international distribution of the source code at issue 
in Bernstein and Karn would not result in the grave, immediate, direct 
and irreparable harm to the Nation required by Justice Brennan in New 
York limes. Because the book Applied Cryptography is already in wide 
circulation internationally, it is hard to imagine what harm is certain to 
befall the country if the codes found in the book were made available to 
the same readers in a different medium. Unlike the information on 
hydrogen bomb construction at issue in the Progressive case, the 
information in Karn has already been widely published and distribut-
ed.271 In Bernstein, the government has offered no evidence that the 
source code at issue poses any threat to national security beyond that 
posed by PGP and equally strong encrypting applications published in 
Applied Cryptography. 
The niche first carved out by Chief Justice Hughes and later defined 
by the Court in New York limes is a narrow one. Only information 
265. Id. at 992-93. 
266. Id. at 993-95. 
267. Id. at 992. 
268. Id. at 993. 
269. The injunction was later lifted after two other magazines published the 
infonnation at issue in The Progressive. Eric B. Easton, Closing the Barn Door After 
the Genie is Out of the Bag: Recognizing a "Futility Principle" in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. I, 8 (1995). 
270. See supra note 8. 
271. Kam v. Unites States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. I, 5 (D.D.C. 1996). 
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which will inevitably, directly and immediately imperil the Nation's 
security is denied First Amendment protection.272 Although there was 
a time when publishing encrypting source code might have fallen within 
this narrow definition, international publication of source code currently 
presents no credible threat. In certain circles around the world, use of 
encryption is ubiquitous. If any of these groups or individuals presently 
want access to military-grade encryption, they need look no further than 
the Internet, their neighborhood library, local bookstore, or nearby 
software retailer. The release of equally strong encrypting source code 
does not pose a threat to national security sufficient to permit a prior 
restraint on publication. Encrypting source code should therefore be 
entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. 
Determining that source code and encrypting applications are protected 
speech does not automatically mean that any regulations will be subject 
to strict scrutiny. The Court has afforded a lower degree of protection 
in the past to certain categories of speech. Offensive _but not obscene 
speech, commercial speech, and speech in a labor context may be 
entitled to less protection than political, literary or scientific speech.273 
Despite its economic applications, encryption is not commercial 
speech. A classic example of commercial speech is an advertisement for 
a business.274 The mere fact that encryption source code is_ being 
printed and sold for a profit does not remove it from the realm of 
protected speech any more than the Wall Street Journal or a scientific 
textbook lose protection merely because they are printed and sold for a 
profit. For certain classes of people, encryption and source code is 
scientific speech. Such is the case for researchers and mathematicians 
like Mr. Bernstein. Most people, however, are not interested in the 
algorithms or source code driving the applications. From the end-user's 
272. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971). 
273. Some Supreme Court opinions seem to treat content-based regulations of 
speech differently depending on the nature of the speech subject to regulation. See 
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2d Ed., (1988) § 12-18. Examples 
of cases drawing these distinctions include: FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) 
(offensive speech); Hoffinan Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (commercial 
speech); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (permitting regulation of obscenity 
but excluding literary, political, artistic, and scientific speech from the definition of 
"obscenity''). 
274. Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (advertisement for prescription drug prices is commercial speech that is afforded 
some degree of constitutional protection). 
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perspective, encryption falls in neither a class of highly protected speech 
nor a class ofless-protected speech. The Court may choose to create a 
new classification of speech for encryption aimed not at the academic, 
but at the end-user. However, if this is class is less protected, such a 
classification scheme raises the problem of a dual standard. A dual 
standard would be created because encryption is squarely within the 
classification of scientific speech for at least some readers. Such a dual 
standard might not only be difficult to administer, but might also make 
a regulation aimed at secrecy futile. The government may plug one hole 
in the dike, but another hole remains open and out of reach of govern-
ment regulators. 
In light of the findings that source code is speech, that the 
AECA/ITAR restraints are content based, and that the First Amendment 
protects encrypting source code because it poses no credible threat to 
national security, it appears that the government has acted unconstitu-
tionally in denying Karn and Bernstein permission to export their wares. 
Buttressing this conclusion is an additional argument founded in the 
closely related futility doctrine. 
E. The Futility Doctrine 
Although the Supreme Court has never formally adopted nor expressly 
referred to the futility doctrine, at least one constitutional law scholar has 
found underpinnings of support for the doctrine in several landmark 
decisions.275 Essentially, the futility doctrine states that "the First 
Amendment imposes a presumption against the [ validity of any] 
suppression of speech when suppression would be futile."276 A futile 
attempt to suppress exists when the information being suppressed is 
already available through another source and the purpose for the desired 
suppression is to preserve secrecy and prevent disclosure of the 
information. The futility doctrine applies only when efforts to suppress 
275. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. 
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 423 U.S. 
1319 (1975). For a complete discussion of the futility doctrine in First Amendment case 
law, see generally Easton, supra note 269. 
276. Easton, supra note 269, at 6. One might argue that adopting the futility 
doctrine would create an incentive to break the law, because individuals could trigger 
the application of the doctrine simply by disclosing the secret infonnation. Once 
disclosed and in the public domain, further disclosure of the infonnation would be 
entitled to the protection of the doctrine. However, this reasoning ignores the 
disincentives to be the first to disclose. Congress has made it a crime to disclose 
information listed on the USML. Those who dare to disclose initially still face criminal 
prosecution for taking the information public. The futility doctrine protects those who 
wish to make use of the information that is already in the public domain but doctrine 
offers nothing to those who disclose hitherto secret information. 
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would be ineffectual. Thus, it would not apply to regulations designed 
to sup~ress "fighting words" merely because another once uttered the 
words. 77 In such a case, continued regulation is not without effect. It 
may be expected to prevent future disturbances of the peace. Addition-
ally, the purpose of the regulation is not related to preserving secrecy. 
Where the issue is the preservation of secrecy, however, once someone 
has revealed and widely distributed the secret, any future regulations 
suppressing that speech would be futile. The idea of prohibiting futile 
restraints on speech has found some support in First Amendment case 
law.21s 
Two concurring opinions and one dissenting opinion in New York 
Tzmes v. United States alluded to the futility doctrine.279 Justice 
Douglas' concurring opinion noted that the government sought to enjoin 
publication of information that the New York Times had already 
distributed.280 Justice White made the same observation and went on 
to question the efficacy of an injunction once the information had 
already been leaked.281 In stating that the petition for injunction came 
too late, the Justices focussed on the futility of prohibiting an act already 
committed.282 
In United States v. Progressive, Inc., the government withdrew its 
injunction barring The Progressive from publishing information about 
how to make a hydrogen bomb once two other publishers had made the 
277. Other classes of speech that would not be protected under the futility doctrine 
include advocacy of lawless conduct, libel or slander, fraudulent misrepresentation, and 
obscenity. 
278. See supra note 275. In another case significant for the scope of the 14th 
Amendment's protection of"liberty," Justice Harlan wrote, ''This 'liberty' is not a series 
of isolated points pricked out in tenns of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, 
press .•• and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a 
freedom from all ... purposeless restraints." "The Fifth Amendment protection on 
'liberty' applies to the federal government and would presumably be no narrower that 
the interests protected by the 14th." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
279. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713 (Douglas, J., concurring, White, J., 
concurring, and Harlan, J., dissenting). 
280. Id. at 723 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
281. "So here, publication has already begun and a substantial part of the threatened 
damage has already occurred .•. access to the documents by many unauthorized people 
is undeniable, and the efficacy of equitable relief against these or other newspapers to 
avert anticipated damage is doubtful at best" Id. at 733 (White, J., concurring). 
282. Easton, supra note 269, at 8. 
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information available to the public.283 Presumably, the government 
attorneys recognized the futility ofbarring the publication of information 
that was already available to the same audience via another source. 
In dealing with the issue of exportation of encryption, the futility 
doctrine presents a compelling case. Strong encryption algorithms are 
already widely available throughout the world, either in source code 
found on computer disks, as downloadable files on the Internet, or in 
books found at local libraries and bookstores. Additionally, the current 
regulatory scheme seems to permit American companies to sell strong 
encryption through their partially-owned subsidiaries located abroad.284 
A circuitous distribution scheme like this does not appear to violate EAR 
or !TAR so long as the parent does not directly supply the technology 
to the subsidiary. There are number of ways for a corporate parent to 
effect distribution without violating the letter of !TAR or EAR.285 
Acknowledging the ineffectiveness of export controls that attempt to 
regulate widely available technology, Congress expressly required that 
the President not impose export controls under the EAA where the 
technology was already widely available abroad.286 Additionally, 
Congress has qualified the President's power to impose export restric-
tions by limiting the controls to those which the government has the 
ability to enforce effectively.287 Together, these statutory limits on the 
Executive power to govern exports are evidence of Congress' concern 
that regulations not be ineffective or unenforceable. These are the same 
concerns that underpin the futility doctrine. 
283. Id. 
284. Sun Microsystems is the first American company to test these waters. Sun 
announced that it will sell 128-bit encryption through a partially-ovmed Russian 
subsidiary called Elvis+ Co. The encryption to be sold through Elvis+ uses triple DES 
and other algorithms. David Bank, Sun's Selling of Encryption to Skirt Policy, WALL 
ST. J., May 19, 1997, at A3. By incorporating a subsidiary ma foreign countiy and then 
creating an Internet storefront on a server located within the boundaries of that nation, 
an American company might be able to use the Internet as a distribution mechanism 
without technically running afoul of the EAR or IT AR. 
285. IDEA, a 128-bit cipher that was authored in Europe, is one example of very 
secure encryption created abroad that could be legally distributed through a partially or 
wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S. company so long as the subsidiary was located 
outside of the United States. U.S. parent corporations could also purchase licenses for 
their foreign subsidiaries to use strong U.S. or foreign-source encryption so long as the 
licensor is located outside the United States. Because IT AR and EAR do not restrict the 
import of strong encryption, a parent and foreign subsidiary could communicate with 
secure encryption without violating either regulatory scheme. 
286. SO U.S.C. § 24O3(c). 
287. SO U.S.C. § 24OS(b)(l )(E). Considering how easily encryption source code and 
software can delivered over the Internet and through e-mail, it would seem that this 
provision of the EAA could never be satisfied with respect to the regulation of 
encryption exports. 
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Applying the futility doctrine to the facts of Bernstein and Kam, it is 
clear that little is accomplished by preventing the export of the diskettes 
containing the same information as contained in the approved-for-export 
book, Applied Cryptography, and Bernstein's approved-for-export 
academic papers. Readers of these materials can easily type or scan the 
source codes contained in print onto a computer diskette, yielding 
virtually the same product that the government banned from export.288 
Iv. CONCLUSION 
Courts faced with petitioners seeking to export encrypting software or 
source code have two related doctrines from which they can draw 
guidance. The first is the prior restraint analysis,289 predicated on a 
finding that source code is speech and that the EAR/ITAR regulations 
are content-based. Closely related to the final question under the prior 
restraint analysis of whether the source code is protected speech is the 
futility doctrine, drawn from dicta taken from several landmark restraint-
of-speech decisions. 
The analysis of the constitutional issues raised in Karn and Bernstein 
reveals that the EAR/ITAR licensing restrictions are both ineffectual in 
advancing the goal of national security and an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on the freedom of speech. In light of these findings, courts faced 
with challenges to encryption export regulations governing source code 
no stronger than that which is already available abroad, should strike 
down the regulations as unconstitutional and permit the petitioners to 
publish and distribute their information abroad.290 
Many experts agree that the proliferation of encryption technology is 
in the best interest of the country.291 At present, parties living in the 
United States with an interest in encrypting software have legal access 
to strong encryption. However, as discussed above, these same parties 
may not distribute copies of the software to friends and colleagues 
abroad without first applying for a license from the government. This 
288. Kam v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 1-3 (D.D.C. 1996). 
289. See supra Parts m.A.-m.D. 
290. Although the USML restricts both enczypting software and hardware, the facts 
surrounding the regulation of software and source code should not be confused with the 
facts surrounding the regulation of enciypting hardware or other items listed on the 
USML. Each case needs to be analyzed on its merits. 
291. See supra notes 231-44 and accompanying text 
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poses a problem because many domestic users of encryption do not have 
the same encrypting programs as their foreign colleagues, making 
compatibility an issue for communicating in secret both internationally 
and domestically. Presumably, the easiest way to resolve the problem 
of incompatible encryption systems is to establish a communications 
protocol beforehand and share common encrypting software between 
parties who anticipate a need to communicate in private. 
The EAR/ITAR regulations prohibit establishing such a protocol 
internationally if the parties wish to use strong encryption. Law-abiding 
citizens are left without secure means to communicate in secret across 
international borders while those who disregard the law freely exchange 
software and source code internationally.292 As a result, networks of 
criminals can place their communications beyond the reach of law 
enforcement while law-abiding citizens' communications remain 
accessible.293 Presumably, law enforcement officials have no legiti-
mate reason to monitor the communications of law-abiding citizens, yet 
increasingly these are the only people whose communications remain 
intelligible to law enforcement and third party eavesdroppers. In short, 
the additional harm which may be wrought by legalizing the internation-
al distribution of encrypting source code is minimal while the benefits 
to be gained are significant. 
Newspapers and magazines have reported widely on the need for 
increased privacy and security over the Internet and the chilling effect 
on speech created by the current lack of privacy.294 These reports deal 
primarily with commercial applications, but apply to noncommercial 
speech as well. Although sending a letter via e-mail may be easier, 
cheaper and more efficient, concerns about privacy may incline one not 
to choose e-mail.295 Alternative forms of communication are available, 
292. See supra note 35. 
293. A group of pedophiles bas published a collection of pornographic photographs 
over the Internet in Europe, using encryption to evade detection by the police. Thomas 
Sancton, Preying on the Young all Over the World, Boys and Girls are Abused in a 
Vicious Sex Trade Now Abetted by Computer Networks, TIME, Sept 2, 1996, at 22. 
294. A simple search performed February 9, 1998 in LEXIS/NEXIS for the key 
words "Internet," and "privacy," or "security'' revealed 32,425 stories fitting the search 
parameters. (search term "atleast2(Internet) and (privacy or security)" in NEWS Library, 
PAPERS File). 
295. Commenting on the ease with which third parties can intercept and read others' 
e-mail, one scholar wrote, "Far from preserving our anonymity, the Web makes us far 
more exposed . • . the more we use machines like telephones and computers for 
communicating, the more we're susceptible to surveillance. If you want to remain 
anonymous, you have to go lo-tech." Rodan, supra note 2, at 4. Arguably, the only 
alternative to "going lo-tech" is to secure communications with strong encryption. 
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but none are as fast or potentially economical as electronic media.296 
However, concerns about privacy may stifle the continued growth and 
use of the Internet. With the proliferation of encryption, privacy 
concerns vanish. The emergence and growth of the Internet presents 
previously unimagined opportunities for communication and the sharing 
of ideas and data. However, just as people act with discretion and limit 
what they talk about with others in public places, users of the Internet 
must do the same. 
In the days of the Framers, parties wishing to talk in private could 
simply select a discrete location and rest assured that no one could 
eavesdrop on their conversation. Today, slipping away to a discrete 
location when communicating across great distances is impossible. 
Encryption enables us to do today across great distances what has been 
possible to do for millennia only in close proximity. In this sense, 
encryption is the equivalent of a digital whisper. 
Concerns about privacy and unauthorized access to our private 
transactions are slowing the development of the Internet and chilling 
electronic speech. Some have implemented ineffectual stopgap measures 
to discourage those with prying eyes, while others simply forgo 
communicating across electronic media when particularly concerned 
about privacy. In all, we have not come close to realizing the full 
potential of the Electronic Information Age. To do so, encryption is 
essential.297 
However, the retarded growth of electronic privacy is not due to an 
unsolvable technical problem. Rather, it appears to be due to a 
296. Like telephone conversations and facsimile transmissions, e-mail communica-
tions can be conducted nearly instantaneously. In addition, once an e-mail account is 
set up, one can send messages to other e-mail users anywhere in the world for the cost 
of a local telephone call - essentially no additional cost to most users. For information 
on the benefits of using e-mail in a legal practice, see Charles R. Merrill, ~ers Push 
the E-Mail Envelope, NEW JERSEY LAW J., Apr. 26, 1993, at 20. 
Note, however, that by sending confidential messages via e-mail, the attorney-client 
privilege may be considered to have been waived. As encryption becomes increasingly 
prolific, and as reports of computer surveillance and electronic espionage continue to 
surface, it is foreseeable that failure to encrypt could prove in the near future to be 
grounds for a negligence cause of action. One legal publisher recently released guidelines 
for use of e-mail and how to avoid liability for, among other things, negligent disclosure. 
Tech Notes, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, June 1996, at 55. See also Marcelo Halvem, Attorney-
Client Privilege in the Internet Age, l INTERNET NEWSLETI'ER: LEGAL AND BUSINESS 
AsPECI'S, July 1996, at 12. 
297. Friedman, supra note 17, at 223. 
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governmental policy begun during the Cold War. The policy has 
survived to this day relatively unscathed through either sheer sclerosis 
or by design, allowing the government continued access to domestic and 
international communications. President Clinton's recent reshuffling of 
the encryption export conqols shows that the Executive Branch is aware 
of the need for more liberal controls over this important communication 
tool. However, it is almost certain that the current Administration fears 
that widespread use of encryption will foil international and domestic 
criminal investigations. Working to prevent this evil, the Administration 
has thrown up a roadblock in the path of encryption proliferation in the 
form of export regulations. The proper tool for such a policy is 
Congressional action.298 
Regardless of the government's actual intent, restraints like those 
implemented through ITAR. EAR and any other similarly fashioned 
regulation are unconstitutional. These regulations, though driven by 
arguably laudable goals, have sought to achieve their ends by suppress-
ing the circulation of protected speech. The choice between suppressing 
information or dealing with the dangers of its publication and potential 
misuse is ultimately made. for us by the First Amendment.299 
RYAN ALAN MURR 
298. Presently, the Congress is considering two bills that would drastica11y change 
the current regulatory framework: Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE), 
H.R. 695 105 Cong. 1st Sess.; Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era 
(Pro-CODE) Act of 1997, S.B. 1726, 104th Cong. 2d Sess., reintroduced as S.B. 377, 
105th Cong. 1st Sess. These bills would liberalize export controls, although to differing 
degrees. Proposed amendments may significantly alter their shape and effect, however, 
amendments proposed by Mike Oxley (R-OH) and Thomas Manton (D-NY) would 
provide immediate law enforcement access to private online communications and 
business transactions, prohibit the domesti~ manufacture, sale, import, and distribution 
of encryption that did not offer law enforcement access, and permit the Attorney General 
to set software standards and Internet service provider standards to ensure access for law 
enforcement 
For more information about these bills, including text of the bills and analysis, see: 
(last modified Nov. 5, 1997) <http://www.cdt.org/crypto/>; 
(visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://www.crypto.com/safe_bill>; 
(visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://www.crypto.com/procode/>. 
299. Virginia State Bd. of Phannacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
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